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Abstract
Nuclear and radiological terrorism is a persistent threat to United States national
security. The research and development of new technological capabilities is vital to
bolstering emergency response and prevention capabilities in support of national security
initiatives. This research characterized the applicable trade-space for a system of
unmanned vehicles deployed for search, detection, and identification of radiological
source material. Exploration included the development of a CONOPS, a functional
decomposition and physical allocation, design considerations, and an analysis of
feasibility and utility. The concept system comprises of a ground control station, ground
vehicle, hybrid-electric multirotor, and fixed-wing vehicle with an open architecture
permitting the exchange of payload components. Payload options include a GeigerMüller detector or scintillator for large area search and a scintillator or high purity
germanium semiconductor for radioisotope identification. Endurance estimates revealed
that a hybrid-electric multirotor is capable of carrying a 6.8-kilogram payload for 58
minutes. Similar estimates indicated that a battery-powered fixed-wing vehicle can
provide a minimum of 41 minutes of endurance with a payload mass fraction of 15%
(1.36-kilogram payload), whereas a gasoline-powered vehicle with the same payload
mass fraction (1.95-kilogram payload) can operate for 12 hours. Electric multirotors are
limited to a maximum endurance of 20 minutes, which is insufficient for radiological
search missions. The system concept proves effective to the radiological search mission
and can be expanded to other mission areas through its open architecture.
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TRADE-SPACE ANALYSIS OF A SMALL UNMANNED VEHICLE SYSTEM
FOR RADIOLOGICAL SEARCH MISSIONS

I. Introduction
Overview
The purpose of this research is to characterize the applicable trade-space for a
small unmanned vehicle system (SUVS) to conduct search, detection, and identification
of radiological and nuclear materials. The system will comprise a combination of
airborne and ground platforms with integrated radiation detectors to complete a
radiological search mission with input from a human operator. Both the platforms and
radiation detectors suitable for the platforms will be discussed to understand the
limitations and feasibility of employment.
Background
Compared to chemical and biological weapons, which also fall under the weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) umbrella, nuclear and radiological materials utilize more
sophisticated and technical processes in order to produce quality material for use. Due to
this complexity, terrorist organizations are unlikely to produce their own materials and
must acquire them through illicit means. These materials are characteristically secured
and monitored during production, transportation, storage, and use so that they are not
compromised. However, there are also large quantities of material available on the black
market due to deficient security and accountability from previous decades. Due to the
numerous uses and locations of radiological and nuclear materials, the opportunity for
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these materials to fall outside of responsible control and be utilized in nuclear terrorism is
a very real threat to national and international security. In order to locate and secure
these materials, federal, state, local, and international partners deploy personnel,
technology, and other investigative methods to detect and interdict illicit radiological and
nuclear materials before being weaponized. As stated by President Trump in the 2018
National Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism, “as the threat
of WMD terrorism continues to evolve, however, our defenses against it must evolve as
well” [1].
As part of the counter-WMD mission space, it is necessary for law enforcement
and military organizations to be able to detect, locate, and confirm radioactive source
material within moderate to large-sized geographic areas. Intelligence gathering may
provide advanced knowledge of personnel, vehicles, infrastructure, location, and intent
associated with radiological materials. However, the radiological search mission is still a
difficult and potentially dangerous logistical problem that is traditionally accomplished
by personnel with handheld detectors. Depending on the quantity and activity of the
radiological isotope as well as the delivery method of an assembled WMD, hazards exist
from both the radioactive material and the weapon’s delivery system. Detectors capable
of confirming radiological materials must be operated and sometimes placed within short
distances of source material for long periods of time to produce accurate and usable data.
Radiation exposure from highly radioactive material can cause health effects or even
death if too much time is spent near the material. Furthermore, explosively driven
WMDs present the potential for severe injury or death if detonated near responding
3

personnel. The capability to find, locate, and confirm the existence of these hazardous
materials utilizing an unmanned system would be a valued asset that could mitigate these
hazards to personnel.
Research and development of unmanned vehicles for radiological response began
in the 1970s with the reactor meltdown at Three Mile Island, which was further expanded
with the second global nuclear accident at Chernobyl in 1986 [2]. There are many sources
of research that have looked at optimizing detector technologies, configurations, and
software to effectively detect, locate, and map radiation strengths [3]–[8]. There are
commercially available systems that utilize detector technologies to provide usable data
to an operator about radiation concentrations as well as real-time video imagery [9].
These systems have only been commercially available for a matter of years, and with
constantly improving hardware and software, this is an area that will continue to progress
and provide a more accurate and practical product to the end user. However, there is
little research looking at utilizing a system of UVs to accomplish radiological search
operations. The development of this system poses unique challenges due to the differing
unmanned platforms: vehicles capable of rapid search may not be capable of dwelling
near a target, while vehicles capable of long dwell times generally have short mission
duration and are incapable of quickly covering large geographic areas. Creating a flexible
system with multiple platforms and multiple integrable detectors allows the use of one
system in several configurations to accomplish a variety of detection, location, and
confirmation scenarios.
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Problem Statement
Several hazards endanger personnel when conducting radiological search
operations. There are potential health effects from the radiation being emitted from the
source material, as well as threats from enemy combatants and potential deterrent devices
in contested areas. Radiation exposure should be kept as low as reasonably achievable,
commonly known by the acronym ALARA [10]. The concept of the ALARA principle is
to expose the minimum amount of people to the minimum amount of radiation for the
minimum amount of time. The same principle can also be applied to the other inherent
dangers of radiological WMD search that are posed by enemy combatants, which would
be to limit time on target to minimize the risk to responding personnel. Therefore, the
development of an unmanned vehicle system for radiological search could contribute to
the radiological search mission by reducing hazardous exposures to personnel and
minimizing the number of personnel required for search operations.
Research Objectives
As mentioned in the background, the threat of WMD terrorism is ever present and
capabilities need to be continually developed and improved to counter their employment
[1]. Establishing a system of UVs for the detection, location, and identification of
radiological and nuclear materials can assist in this mission set and act as a force
multiplier for law enforcement and military organizations. Several research objectives
have been established to fully characterize the system of UVs that could be developed for
radiological search operations:
1.

Characterize the SUVS trade-space for radiological search missions
5

2.

Develop the system framework along with the system limitations,
capabilities, and design considerations

3.

Assess the operational feasibility and utility from a functional and scenario
perspective

For the purposes of this research, a trade-space analysis frames the solution space
in which a viable and feasible result may reside [11]. When considering a radiological
search SUVS and the research objectives identified above, several questions arise that
will assist with addressing the objectives and the concept system design. What
radiological sources are of the most interest? Which detectors are suitable for finding
these sources and can be incorporated on an unmanned platform? What are the operating
characteristics and limitations of these detectors? What would a shared system
architecture consist of in terms of similar and differing components for radiological
search and detector integration?
Methodology Overview
This research is a targeted mission area analysis scoped at the feasibility and
suitability of a SUVS in support of radiological search and geolocation missions. The
methods include a survey of the existing state of technology for both radiological
detection and unmanned vehicle capabilities, the development of a concept of operations
(CONOPS), a system decomposition, and an analysis of the feasibility and utility of the
proposed system.
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Research Limitations
The focus for this research is limited to sealed radiological and nuclear source
material search, detection, location, and confirmation. A sealed source is any radioactive
material that is encased in a manner that prevents leakage or escape of the material [10].
The encasement’s primary purpose is to prevent the spread of contamination during
regular use or transportation of the material. Radiological sources can be found in
medicine, agriculture, industry, transportation, research, construction, geology, and
mining. These sources are regularly lost or stolen, which can lead to weaponization in
the form of a WMD. This research is not addressing WMD-related hazards or tactics,
techniques, and procedures for operating in the vicinity of suspect WMDs. Additionally,
this research is not focusing on nuclear and radiological incident consequence
management operations that address the spread of contamination to people and the
environment [12].
Previous Work
A previous Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) graduate student researched
various radiation detector technologies to be flown on a small autonomous unmanned air
vehicle and developed algorithms to rapidly detect, locate, and identify radiation sources.
Another AFIT graduate student investigated the use of employing chemical sensors on
unmanned aerial systems (UAS) in a tactical environment. The research focused on
developing and employing tactics, techniques, and procedures for conducting chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) reconnaissance and surveillance utilizing
small UAS [13]. This research was used as a starting point for this thesis.
7

Preview of Thesis
This thesis is written in a traditional format. Chapter II discusses terminology,
existing technologies, and previous research regarding radiation detectors and unmanned
platforms. Chapter III addresses the methodology used to characterize the unmanned
system and radiation detection trade-spaces. The findings and results from trade-space
analysis are detailed in Chapter IV. The thesis is concluded with Chapter V, which
reviews the research findings and presents potential avenues for additional research.
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II. Literature Review
Chapter Overview
This chapter will cover the fundamental science of radiation detectors to better
understand the different parameters that may affect design decisions for equipping an
unmanned vehicle. Furthermore, current unmanned technologies will be discussed to
provide background information on the current state of technology that is available
through commercial sources or pre-existing government systems.
Types of Radiation
There are multiple forms of radiation that are typically categorized by charged
particle emissions and uncharged radiation. Charged particle radiation includes alpha
particles, beta particles, and fission fragments. Uncharged radiation includes neutrons,
gamma rays, and x-rays. X-rays, alpha particles, and beta particles are typically
measured for contamination monitoring or for surveying and assessing a consequence
management scenario (e.g. post nuclear detonation). Gamma rays and neutrons travel
orders of magnitude further than alpha or beta particles, making them better suited for
initial detection and location of radiological material [14]. Within the confines of the
radiological search mission space and this research, gamma rays are the primary radiation
of concern.
Gamma rays are photons with energies typically in the kilo- and mega-electron
volt (keV, MeV) range. These photons are typically emitted when an excited nuclei
transitions to a lower energy level, with the gamma energy determined by the differential
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of the excited and ground states of the nucleus. Many radioisotope decay events, such as
alpha particle emission or nuclear fission, produce subsequent gamma photons in order to
maintain nuclear stability [14].
Radiological Sources of Concern
There are over one thousand isotopes that have been found or created on earth,
with the large majority being radioactive. Of the hundreds of radioactive isotopes, the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) developed a list of isotopes that have
hazardous direct human health effects when exposed to a sufficient quantity of said
isotopes over a period of time. Using this list, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC), working with the Department of Energy (DOE) and other agencies, established a
list of 16 radionuclides of concern that, if gathered in significant quantities based on
radioactivity (measured in Terabecquerels or Curies), carry the greatest risk of being
incorporated into a radiological dispersal device (RDD) by terrorists (Table 1). The 16
threat isotopes can be found in most developed countries and are commonly used in
research, medical, and industrial applications [15].
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Table 1. Category 1 and category 2 radioactive material thresholds [16]
Radioactive
Material

Category 1
(Terabecquerel)

Category 1
(Curie)

Category 2
(Terabecquerel)

Category 2
(Curie)

Americium-241

60

1,620

0.6

16.2

Americium-241/Be

60

1,620

0.6

16.2

Californium-252

20

540

0.2

5.4

Cobalt-60

30

810

0.3

8.1

Curium-244

50

1,350

0.5

13.5

Cesium-137

100

2,700

1

27

1,000

27,000

10

270

Iridium-192

80

2,160

0.8

21.6

Plutonium-238

60

1,620

0.6

16.2

Plutonium-239/Be

60

1,620

0.6

16.2

40,000

1,080,000

400

10,800

Radium-226

40

1,080

0.4

10.8

Selenium-75

200

5,400

2

54

Strontium-90

1,000

27,000

10

270

Thulium-170

20,000

540,000

200

5,400

300

8,100

3

81

Gadolinium-153

Promethium-147

Ytterbium-169

Categories of Radiological and Nuclear WMDs
In the realm of WMDs, there are a few types that encompass the radiological and
nuclear category, which are radiological dispersal devices (RDD), radiological exposure
devices (RED), and improvised nuclear devices (IND). INDs are different from RDDs
and REDs in that they use fissile materials, such as Uranium-235 or Plutonium-239, in
order to create a nuclear yield through a nuclear fission chain reaction. They can either
be an illicit nuclear weapon that is bought, stolen, or obtained from a nuclear state, or is
fabricated by a terrorist group using illegally obtained fissile nuclear material. The
11

nuclear explosion from an IND releases intense amounts of energy through shockwaves,
heat, prompt radiation emission, and radioactive fission fragments (also known as
radioactive fallout). INDs are not the focus of this research, as they present unique
challenges for detecting, but it is important to understand the differences between INDs,
REDs, and RDDs. REDs utilize highly radioactive materials to irradiate some arbitrary
area without physically disbursing the radioisotopes [17]. An example of a RED is a
gamma ray source, such as Cobalt-60, that is taped to the underside of a public bus seat.
This would expose all passengers within a certain area with potentially harmful doses of
gamma radiation while remaining inconspicuous. RDDs also utilize highly radioactive
materials, but actively disburse them using delivery systems such as explosives,
pressurized containers, fans, sprayers, crop dusters, or building ventilation systems.
Compared to REDs, RDDs can potentially contaminate very large areas with extremely
small pieces of radioactive material [17]. The resultant cleanup and decontamination are
a serious and challenging problem for emergency first responders, which stresses the
importance of detecting and locating illicit source material before a WMD can be
constructed and employed.
Gamma Interactions
In order to locate and identify gamma photons from the radioisotopes discussed
previously, we need to understand how they will interact with materials in the
environment as well as our detectors. There are two primary mechanisms by which this
occurs; photoelectric absorption (PE) and Compton scattering (CS). In PE absorption, a
gamma photon is absorbed by an atomic electron that is then ejected from one of the
12

atom’s electron shells. This electron then deposits its energy in the material; if this
interaction occurs in a radiation detector, it can produce a signal (voltage, current, etc.)
that is proportional to the energy of the incident photon. Similarly, CS occurs when a
gamma ray collides with an atomic electron; in this event, the gamma ray transfers a
portion of its energy to the electron and scatters in a different direction from its incident
trajectory. As with a PE electron, the recoiled electron will traverse the material where
the interaction occurred and deposit its energy, possibly producing an output signal in our
radiation detector [14].
Gamma Spectroscopy
Once the gamma photons interact with our detector and produce measurable
signals, a histogram can be produced that correlates said signals to incident gamma
energies. The measured gamma energies are grouped into energy bins, typically
quantified in kiloelectron volts (keV). The height of an energy bin represents the number
of counted interactions that correspond to the energy bin. Across the measured energy
spectrum, the histogram of energy bins and corresponding counts represents a waveshaped line called a pulse height spectrum. The clarity of a pulse height spectrum varies
and is characterized by the detector resolution, which is a measure of the detector’s
ability to differentiate the signals produced by gamma interactions. The full width at half
maximum (FWHM) is the width of the gamma ray peak at half of the highest point on the
peak distribution. Detector resolution is the FWHM divided by the energy of this peak
gamma ray and is conventionally expressed as a percentage. The lower the detector
resolution percentage, the more defined a spectral line is, resulting in a higher likelihood
13

to identify radioisotopes. Detector resolution is affected by the detector technology, the
algorithms associated with the detector software, and varies with the energy of the
incident gamma ray [14]. An example pulse height spectrum delineated into energy bins
and counted events is shown in Figure 1. It is important to understand how a detector’s
resolution impacts the accuracy of identifying the radioisotopes that are present.

Figure 1. Voltage pulses collected into energy bins [18]
High-resolution (low percentage) detectors are more likely to differentiate between
measured energy bins, allowing a more accurate assessment of which isotopes may be
present. Low-resolution (high percentage) detectors may struggle to differentiate gamma
photons that have similar energies, as they may be lumped together into a single energy
bin. The precision of different detector technologies can be seen in Table 2. Energy
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resolutions of different radionuclide identification devices (RID) gamma ray detector
types and Figure 2.
Table 2. Energy resolutions of different radionuclide identification devices (RID)
gamma ray detector types [19]
Detector Type
Thallium-doped Sodium Iodide (NaI(Tl))

Resolution at 662 keV
6 - 8%

Lanthanum Bromide (LaBr₃)

2 - 4%

Cadmium Zinc Telluride (CZT)

1 - 2%

High Purity Germanium (HPGe)

< 0.2%

Figure 2. Barium-133 gamma ray spectra acquired with various RIDs [19]
Low-resolution detector materials, such as NaI, can lead to energy measurements blurring
together into one energy peak, which does not accurately represent the energy spectrum
and can lead to the misidentification of a radioisotope or a false negative. This blurring
15

of NaI spectra can be seen in Figure 2 in the 300 keV to 400 keV range when compared
to the other detector technologies. Furthermore, to attain the resolution of 7% listed in
Table 2, the NaI detector measurement has a FWHM of about 47 keV from a 662 keV
incident gamma ray. On the other hand, high-resolution detectors (e.g. high purity
germanium) can differentiate between gamma energies that are within a few keV of each
other [19]. In order to achieve a resolution of 0.2% listed in Table 2, the HPGe detector
measurement has a FWHM of about 1.5 keV at 662 keV.
Detection Efficiency
A competing characteristic to detector resolution is efficiency; there are two
components that make up detection efficiency, geometric and intrinsic. The geometric
efficiency is determined primarily by a detector’s distance from the radiation source and,
to a lesser degree, the size of the detector. If we make the reasonable assumption that our
gamma source is emitting photons isotropically, and that the size of the detector is small
compared to the distance between it and the source, the fraction of emitted photons that
will reach the detector (𝜀𝐺 ) is inversely proportional to the square of the separation
distance (𝑟 2 ) (Equation 1) [14].

𝜺𝑮 ∝

𝟏
𝒓𝟐

(1)

If there is little to no material for the gammas to interact with between the source and the
detector, this relationship can inform operational parameters such as standoff distance
and loiter time.

16

In contrast, intrinsic efficiency is a function of the detector itself, and is
determined by the interaction material, its volume, and the energy of the incident photon.
Dense materials, such as scintillators and semiconductors discussed later, have a higher
concentration of electrons per volume for photons to interact with compared to gaseous
material. All other parameters being equal, e.g. charge collection or conversion
efficiency, a detector with a low-density material will need a larger volume than one with
a higher density, affecting operational parameters such as vehicle size and carry capacity
[14], [18].
Gamma Attenuation
Gamma attenuation is when a certain quantity of gamma rays passes through an
intervening material. This is due to the previously mentioned PE and CS interactions that
occur. Attenuation can have a large effect on the amount and strength of gamma energies
incident on a detector volume. When intervening material is present, the quantity of
incident gamma rays is decreased and Equation 1 no longer applies; such intervening
material, such as building walls or radiation shielding, would require a detector to be
closer for detection and identification.
Gas-Filled Detectors
Gas-filled detectors operate when incident radiation interacts with fill gas to
create ionizations. Using an applied voltage across a cathode and anode, ions are
collected to create an electrical signal in the form of a current or pulse [20]. Gas-filled
detector volumes are typically sealed and pressurized in order to preserve the
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performance of the fill gas [21]. The output signal of a gas-filled detector is dependent
on the voltage applied, which is pictured in Figure 3. The higher the applied voltage, the
higher the output signal. Gas-filled detectors for radiation surveying are typically
operated in three regions: ionization, proportional, and Geiger-Müller (G-M). Due to the
low voltage of the ionization region, there is no amplification of the number of ions
created by incident radiation, resulting in a detector measurement that is directly
proportional to the number of original ion pairs created. The proportional region has a
higher-applied voltage and operates similarly to the ionization region, except that the
original ion pairs are amplified, creating more ionizations in the detector volume. The
measurement of the resulting pulse is proportional to the number of original ion pairs
formed. The G-M region has the highest usable operating voltage. This significant
voltage difference leads to an avalanche effect following gamma interactions, increasing
the produced ions by up to one million-fold throughout the entire detector volume [22].
Gas is not dense and has a low probability for interaction with incident radiation.
Therefore, a larger gas-filled volume increases the probability for interaction.
Additionally, operating gas-filled detectors in the G-M region increases the potential for
ion pairs to be attracted to the charged electrodes, making it ideal for large area searches.
Operation in this region gives the most sensitive detection capability but requires the
addition of a separate power supply in order to meet voltage requirements.
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Figure 3. Gas-filled detector six region curve for gamma interactions [22]
The extra batteries, along with the necessity to increase detector volume, increases weight
and space requirements and adds heat to the system. A negative aspect of gas-filled
detectors is the inability to differentiate between different radiation energies. However,
this is a capability that scintillators and semiconductors possess.
Scintillation Detectors
Scintillation is when radiation interacts with certain detector media and produces
visual light. Scintillators can be organic or inorganic and can be a liquid, solid, or gas,
but solid materials are the most common for detectors. They are typically encased in
reflective materials to provide extra rigidity, waterproofing, and to prevent luminesced
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light from escaping [20]. A photomultiplier tube or photodiode converts the light into an
electrical pulse that can be interpreted by detector software [14].
Each scintillation material has different inherent properties that need to be
considered for detector selection, such as hygroscopicity, decay time, and sensitivity to
shock. Some materials degrade if exposed to water, even water vapor in ambient air, so
airtight chambers are required for certain scintillators. Additionally, scintillators are
typically dense crystals that require photomultiplier tubes to convert light into meaningful
data. This adds weight and space requirements that need to be considered for UV
application. However, scintillators require significantly lower applied potential
compared to gas-filled detectors, so a separate power supply is not necessary for
operation. Vibrations can also be of concern for some scintillating materials. Depending
on the scintillator, vibrations can induce counts in the materials and can damage brittle
crystals, which could produce false positives and unreliable data if using for search
operations [3], [23].
Plastic scintillators are low-cost, robust, and can be made very large. However,
the detectors lack resolution and are ineffective for identification of a radioisotope.
NaI scintillators are very common and have been employed for decades. NaI crystals can
be made large (in excess of 10 centimeters x 10 centimeters x 46 centimeters) but are
considerably more expensive than plastic scintillators. The advantage of sodium iodide is
that it can be applied to both initial search and identification of source material.
Handheld versions may be undersized for UV purposes, but a larger crystal could give
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better detection efficiency while maintaining spectroscopic abilities for isotope
identification [4].
Semiconductor Detectors
Semiconductor detectors do not luminesce when interacting with gamma rays.
The process is similar to gas-filled detectors, which measure resulting ionizations from
radiation interactions over a voltage difference [14]. However, semiconductor detectors
differ from scintillators and gas-filled detectors in that they directly measure excited
electrons, which produces much better energy resolution [22]. HPGe detectors are
commonly used for the detection and identification of radioisotopes due to their excellent
resolution. The disadvantages of these systems are that they must be cryogenically cooled
with liquid nitrogen or an electromechanical Stirling-cycle cooler, resulting in a very
heavy instrument. Additionally, HPGe detectors are significantly more expensive than
scintillators. An example system is the Ortec Micro-Detective. This is a 15-pound (6.8kilogram) handheld detector that utilizes an electromechanically cooled HPGe crystal. It
is capable of producing a resolution of less than one percent and can operate for 5 hours
on a rechargeable Lithium-ion battery. However, the detector performance can be
affected by vibration and heat [4].
Multirotor Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Current commercially available multirotor systems use either electric power
plants using lithium polymer batteries or hybrid-electric systems that utilize gas engines
as generators to produce power for electrically driven motors. Electrically driven
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systems have limited operational flight times due to the low energy density of battery
technology. Electric multirotor systems with sensors other than small cameras are
typically limited to 30-minute duration flights, which is not ideal for conducting
radiological search operations. On the other hand, hybrid-electric systems have had
success in more robust and longer duration applications due to the higher energy density
that gasoline provides as an energy source [24]. Gasoline-powered generators allow
hybrid-electric multirotor vehicles to fly much longer and farther than their all-electric
counterparts. Commercially available hybrid-electric systems currently on the market list
specifications that are vast improvements upon battery powered systems. Claims of 5hour flight duration, payloads as heavy as 12 pounds (5.5 kilograms), and a range of 110
miles (177 kilometers) are a few examples from Skyfront’s Perimeter-8 model [25]. The
longer duration, range, and heavier payload capabilities make multirotor systems much
more attractive and applicable to arenas such as emergency response and military
operations [24]. However, gasoline engines present unique design and operating issues
that do not affect battery-powered systems, such as mechanical noise, combustion noise,
engine start-up, generator maintenance, exhaust, cooling, and vibrations. These
additional side effects of a hybrid-electric power plant could affect the overall
performance of the system and the feasibility of deploying and operating in constrained
environments.
Fixed-wing Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
The purpose of a fixed-wing vehicle within this system would be to cover a large
area during initial the search for radiological material. In order to increase the likelihood
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for successful detection, the vehicle should operate at lower altitudes to have the highest
probability of radiation interaction with the on-board radiological detection system.
Additionally, time over target is also an issue due to detector hardware and software
delays. A fast platform may not detect radiological material during overflight compared
to a slower moving platform. Therefore, a balance between speed and endurance must be
managed in order to adequately meet desired performance outcomes. Fixed-wing
platforms have been around longer than multirotor systems and can vary greatly in size
and in the type of power plant. Hand-thrown battery-powered platforms have been
operated in many restrictive and rural environments but are limited by the payload weight
and area that can be covered. Incorporating liquid fuel engines to drive single propellers
has proven successful for platforms over 20 pounds (9.1 kilograms). An example of
small UAS capabilities is the UAV Factory Penguin series. It is available as a batterypowered system or with an electronic fuel-injected engine, with claims such as endurance
from 110 minutes to 20 hours, range of up to 60 miles (97 kilometers), and a payload
upwards of 22 pounds (10 kilograms). Early models of the system have been flown since
2009 and are utilized in more than 43 countries [26].
Unmanned Ground Vehicles
Unmanned ground vehicles were some of the earliest operated unmanned mobile
systems. They were utilized as early as 1981 during the Chernobyl nuclear reactor
meltdown in the attempt to limit exposure to responding personnel [2]. Many variants
and sizes are currently operated by federal and local governments across the United
States and internationally. Ground vehicles have the advantage of being able to loiter in
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an area for long periods of time and also carry the heaviest payloads compared to aerial
vehicles. However, ground vehicles are limited in range and can be disabled by rough
terrain and obstructions.
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III. Methodology
Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the methods used for analyzing multiple
focus areas of the radiological search mission. The resulting research will culminate in
characterizing the trade-space for the unmanned vehicle system. Methods to be used
include a concept of operations, a system decomposition, and a feasibility analysis of
utilizing the system for radiological search operations and other mission areas. The flow
of this research will resemble the highlighted portion of the systems engineering “V”,
which is depicted on the left side of Figure 4.

Figure 4. Systems engineering “V” for system development [27]
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A CONOPS for the system will be established with corresponding measures of
effectiveness (MOEs) at the mission level. The CONOPS is not linked to user
requirements, but rather a hypothetical approach to unmanned vehicles for completing
radiological search missions currently accomplished with human operators. Use cases
will be derived from the CONOPS, as well as resulting tasks, attributes and measures of
performance (MOPs). A system decomposition of the functional system architecture
with functional tasks and a physical hierarchy will be derived in order to allocate system
functions to componentry. The approaches to these methods will be further discussed
below.
Concept of Operations
An assessment of radiological search operations will be conducted in order to
determine the realistic operational umbrella that an unmanned system could be deployed
in support of. Understanding the limitations of the mission space that the system is
applicable to will also apply to the derivation of the system’s architectural makeup as
well as potential architecture modifications needed to make the system useful in other
mission areas. Within the overarching mission of performing radiological search, it is
important to understand what limitations there are by introducing unmanned platforms
and what information needs to be collected and delivered by an unmanned system. A
CONOPS will be established which will detail mission needs, limitations, capabilities,
and scenarios appropriate to the system. Additionally, it will include the tasks, attributes,
and measures of the conceptualized system [28].
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The CONOPS will also include a mission timeframe, operational needs, system
limitations, enabling capabilities for system operation, and valid scenarios for system
employment. The system CONOPS will frame the mission set that it can be deployed in
support of. An example CONOPS from the 2019 AFIT UAS three-course design and
testing series will be used as a baseline for this research. In addition, some imposed
design requirements of the system will be presumed and discussed in terms of their
functionality to the mission and why they are important for operational use.
Mission needs will provide information about expected capabilities the system
should have to perform the radiological search mission. These can be made for both
friendly and adversarial conditions and will be logical, realistic, and necessary for
continuing the conceptualization process. Unrealistic assumptions will be avoided, with
the focus being placed on gaps in knowledge that are important for successful planning
and characterization of the system. Operational limitations can be physical in nature or
be due to self-imposed policy that restricts operational functionality. Policy can be
leadership driven, multinational, or economic based. Operational constraints can be
imposed in the form of rules of engagement, which can vary between commands,
organizations, and political boundaries. Policy concerns will not be discussed in this
research, with the focus being placed on physical operational limitations of the various
subsystems of the unmanned system. Environmental and scenario-specific constraints
will be addressed as part of the physical limitations.
Lastly, scenario examples will be provided in order to understand the range of
missions that the conceptualized system can cover. These scenarios define friendly and
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adversarial conditions, enabling capabilities for system functionality, and the expected
value toward mission completion. The scenarios used in this research are not allencompassing of the system’s abilities but provide context to the potential utility of the
system.
System Decomposition
Using the CONOPS, a decomposition of the system will be derived. The
decomposition will consist of a use case model for the system, a functional
decomposition, and an allocation of system functions to physical componentry. The
CONOPS will drive the contents of the functional decomposition. The CONOPS will
have traceability to the functional decomposition and the physical architecture of each
system module. At the basic level, physical componentry of the various systems will be
linked to performing all tasks associated with completing the radiological search mission.
The functional decomposition and allocation will be completed using Cameo
System Modeler 19.0, which is a model-based systems engineering software tool that
uses Systems Modeling Language (SysML) to develop systems engineering solutions
[29]. As a starting point for the functional decomposition and allocation, a reference
architecture will be used and expanded upon. The reference architecture (RA) was
developed by several AFIT professors associated with the small unmanned aerial system
courses [30]. The RA is organized by four top-level packages, which comprise a
component library, a basic multirotor system, a basic ground control station (GCS), and
an example system concept integrating the GCS and fixed-wing UV. Components within
each package are further broken down into value properties and ports that characterize
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the component, such as memory capacity, operating system type, radio frequency, and
cost. The properties are customizable for the user’s desired specificity, but not
comprehensive of everything that may need to be measured. Additional properties can be
added to the concept system’s componentry blocks as needed. Lastly, the RA provides
an example of a decomposed CONOPS for a remote targeting system with a use case
model and the associated activity diagrams. The user of the RA is responsible for
developing a use case model and functional tasks that meet the requirements for the
pertinent CONOPS with traceability to physical componentry, which is the end state of
the system decomposition for this research.
Using the established use cases, tasks, attributes, measures, as well as MOEs,
MOPs, and performance factors will be derived that exemplify mission execution of the
use cases [31]. Mission-level tasks that feed into mission execution will be identified
along with important attributes that are valuable and feasible to measure. These tasks,
attributes, and measures are evaluating the mission space from an agnostic perspective,
pertaining to both human and system execution. An MOE is a measure of how well an
operational task or set of tasks is executed within its expected operational environment.
MOEs will be established that pertain to the radiological search mission and the expected
operating environmental conditions yet are mission-based and not system-specific [32].
MOPs are a refinement of MOEs and provide measurable performance factors that help
evaluate an MOE’s status. The attributes will coincide with MOPs and the attributes’
measures will be analogous to listed performance parameters. The list will not be
exhaustive of all potential MOEs, MOPs, and performance parameters, but will highlight
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key factors that characterize the system’s effectiveness at completing the radiological
search mission.
Analysis of Feasibility and Utility
The last segment of this research is to evaluate the feasibility of incorporating the
system into radiological search operations. The spectrum of mission operations will be
considered, to include execution of the entire operation with an unmanned system,
incorporating the system into a portion of operations, or not utilizing the system for
radiological search missions. However, the focus of the feasibility discussion will be the
scenarios identified in the CONOPS. As part of the feasibility analysis, estimates of
vehicle endurance will be determined corresponding to vehicle size, battery and fuel
capacity, and payload size. Furthermore, the system’s utility to other mission areas will
be assessed, along with the necessary system architecture modifications to expand its
capabilities for current and emerging missions.
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IV. Analysis and Results
Chapter Overview
From the methodology presented in Chapter III, the analysis of the radiological
search system will be approached from an academic yet practical perspective.
Characterizing the system, its capabilities, and the physical framework to meet those
capabilities are beneficial for gaining an accurate sight picture of the conceptualized
system. However, the academic approach will culminate with the feasibility analysis of
the system by realistically considering the potential benefits and possible drawbacks that
this system could present to gaining units and agencies for the radiological search
mission and other mission areas. New technological capabilities are not always viable to
replace or supplement current tactics, techniques, and procedures, which will be
discussed at the end of this chapter.
Concept of Operations
This CONOPS defines a prototype system and the associated efforts to assess
system architecture and demonstrate the feasibility and utility of a concept solution
before a prototype demonstration phase. The CONOPS, and the proposed system
framework solutions associated with it, address the system’s vehicles, sensors, user
interface software, communication system, support functions, and operator actions for
application to the radiological search mission.
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Scope
This CONOPS is intended to be an enabling concept and is written at the tactical
level. More specifically, the radiological search CONOPS describes the projected
utilization by Department of Defense (DoD) CBRN personnel, explosive ordnance
disposal (EOD) technicians, and special operations forces (SOF), as well as analogous
federal, state, and local entities necessitating the capability to detect, locate and confirm
the existence of hazardous radiological material. The radiological sources will be in one
of two categories: an orphan source where the material is lost or stolen or when the
material has already been weaponized into an RDD or RED.
Mission Timeframe
Mission timeframe refers to the expected time it will take to research, develop,
acquire, test, and deploy the objective system to operational units. The intent for the
system’s research and development phase is to utilize commercial off the shelf (COTS)
and government off the shelf (GOTS) technologies to reduce initial startup time typically
seen for newly developed systems. Applying previously researched and tested equipment
to system construction will expedite this portion of the process. It will also shorten the
time required to develop training programs and support equipment required to field the
system. The mission timeframe is expected to be between two and five years. Two years
is a best-case estimate to allow for research, acquisition, testing of the separate
components, and assembling them into an operative system of systems. This also includes
the procurement of support equipment and the development and execution of training for
system operation and maintenance. The system should be completed and fielded within
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five years due to the rapid pace of innovation in the unmanned vehicle industry. A
system under development for a longer period of time will be outpaced and become
obsolete prior to becoming operationally fielded.
Mission Needs
The system will deploy to meet intelligence-based missions as required or to aid
in the search and recovery of lost, stolen, or other forms of radiological source material.
The system under consideration should be small in size but capable of searching an area
of 3 square kilometers or larger, to include, but not be limited to, large urban buildings
and sea-based vessels. The system is to be used by tactically deployable units from
federal, state, and local organizations, so logistical requirements should be moderately
small in size. The system should function with no more than four human operators and
should be deployable utilizing no more than a transport vehicle and trailer for
transportation. The objective system should be easily maintainable and should integrate
as many COTS and GOTS components as possible. Garrison maintenance equipment
capabilities and battery charging units are within the scope of the objective system. This
does not include commonly found tools such as wrenches and screw drivers. While the
unmanned vehicles are intended to be reusable, the cost of the systems should be
sufficiently low to allow disposal in lieu of costly decontamination, hazardous recovery,
and vehicle loss or theft. Due to the potential operation in contested areas, loss or theft of
system vehicles should not provide substantial exploitable information or materiel to
adversarial forces.
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The baseline system shall contain a combination of air vehicles, a ground vehicle,
and a ground control station for user interface. Using the system of vehicles equipped
with various and interchangeable payloads, the system will be able to locate and confirm
the existence of radiological source material, as well as generate a three-dimensional
radiation dose rate contour map of the search area. Due to the continuous improvement
of technology in unmanned vehicles and radiation detection equipment, the system shall
employ a modular, open system architecture which facilitates the integration of new
sensors and subsystems throughout its lifecycle. This includes but is not limited to
defense programs of record (PORs), COTS and GOTS technologies, and sensors
associated with other CBRN constituents. However, the system should make extensive
use of COTS and GOTS componentry and existing vehicles in order to minimize
development time and system cost. The objective system’s air vehicles shall adhere to
DoD UAS Group 1, Group 2, or small Group 3 weight, altitude, and speed requirements
for low altitude maneuverability and tactical deployability (Table 3).
Lastly, the system will allow for semi-autonomous operation with real-time,
human-in-the-loop control. Each operational task will require a certain level of human
input, which necessitates a varying degree of control given to the GCS or on-board
processor. The level of autonomy will be driven by the risk of each task and the impact it
has on mission completion. The overall level of autonomy is relatively low, with most
tasks requiring operator input or pre-planned tasks for the system to execute.
Consequentially, the shared responsibility between a human operator and the system GCS
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Table 3. Unmanned aircraft systems categorization chart [33]

UA
Category

Maximum
Gross
Takeoff
Weight
(lb)[kg]

Normal
Operating
Altitude (ft)[m]

Speed
(KIAS)

Representative UAS

WASP III, TACMAV
RQ-14A/B, Buster,
Nighthawk, RQ-11B,
FPASS, RQ16A, Pointer,
Aqua/Terra Puma

Group 1

(0-20)
[0-9]

(< 1,200 AGL)
[< 366 AGL]

(100)

Group 2

(21-55)
[10-25]

(< 3500 AGL)
[< 1,067 AGL]

(< 250)

ScanEagle, Silver Fox,
Aerosonde

Group 3

(< 1,320)
[< 599]

(< 250)

RQ-7B Shadow, RQ-15
Neptune, XPV-1 Tern,
XPV-2 Mako

Group 4

(> 1,320)
[> 599]

Group 5

(> 1,320)
[> 599]

(< 18,000 MSL)
[< 5,486 MSL]

MQ-5B Hunter, MQ-8B
Any
Fire Scout, MQ-1C Gray
Airspeed Eagle, MQ-1A/B/C
Predator

MQ-9 Reaper, RQ-4
(> 18,000 MSL)
Any
[> 5,486 MSL] Airspeed Global Hawk, RQ-4N
Triton
Legend

AGL
ft
KIAS
kg
lb

above ground level
feet
knots indicated airspeed
kilogram
pound

m
meter
MSL mean sea level
UA unmanned aircraft
UAS unmanned aircraft system

will range from #1 to #4 across the Taxonomy of the Distribution of Responsibility
between Human and Computer (Figure 5).
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1. Human does all planning, scheduling, optimizing, etc. and turns task over to computer
merely for deterministic execution.
2. Computer provides options but the human chooses between them, plans the
operations, and then turns task over to computer for execution.
3. Computer helps to determine options, and suggests one for use, which human may or
may not accept before turning task over to computer for execution.
4. Computer selects option and plans action, which human may or may not approve,
computer can reuse options suggested by human.
5. Computer selects action and carries it out if human approves.
6. Computer selects options, plans, and actions and displays them in time for human to
intervene and then carries them out in default if there is no human input.
7. Computer does entire task and informs human of what it has done.
8. Computer does entire task and informs human only if requested.
9. Computer does entire task and informs human if it believes the latter needs to know.
10. Computer performs entire task autonomously, ignoring the human supervisor who
must completely trust the computer in all aspects of decision making.

Figure 5. Taxonomy of the distribution of responsibility between human and
computer [34]
Enabling Capabilities
Some capabilities fall outside of the radiological search SUVS scope but are
necessary to enable the system’s effective use. While the system may make use of onboard navigation sensors for terrain avoidance, it is anticipated that the system will utilize
the global navigation satellite system (GNSS) for maneuvering to waypoints, tracking its
position, and mapping radiation strength of the search area. Low cost alternative
navigation (non-GNSS) technologies are emerging but may not be available for
deployment in the two to five-year window envisioned for this system. The system
should be transportable by a light to medium-duty truck with a trailer or a small
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waterborne vessel for deploying the system to the operational area of concern. The
transport vehicle should be capable of powering the GCS and associated GCS-operated
equipment, as well as charging vehicle batteries when forward deployed. However,
external power may be required when forward deployed for multiple missions or long
durations.
Scenarios
The listed scenarios are broad and cover the entirety of mission phases that need
to be accomplished by the system. The scenarios not only pertain to the conceptualized
system, but also entail inherent interactions and inputs from the human operators of the
system. The envisioned phases of system operation include ground control setup and
teardown, vehicle deployment, mission execution, and system recovery.
Ground Control Setup & Teardown Phase
This phase encompasses all actions necessary to deploy the SUVS including
unpacking, inventory, assembly, function checks, mission planning, disassembly, and
reconstitution. Since the system is intended for use with forward deployable units,
transportation of the system must be compatible with deployed vehicles or small
waterborne vessels. The system must be capable of operating without externally supplied
power. A system built-in-test will signal to the operator if the system is fully operational;
if the system is not 100% operational, the built-in-test will identify all system faults.
Mission planning for the system should be practicable prior to deployment, prior to
beginning operations when on site, and modifiable during on-going operations once
vehicles have been launched.
37

Vehicle Deployment Phase
This phase encompasses all actions necessary to achieve initial vehicle movement
starting from a properly configured vehicle or vehicles and a ground control station. No
more than two operators should be required to deploy a vehicle. Following built-in-tests,
mission plans should be wirelessly uploaded to involved vehicles prior to launch. The
vehicle deployment phase ends once movement toward the target area is achieved and the
system begins waypoint navigation.
Mission Phase
This phase includes a variety of tasks as defined by the selected payloads and
established mission plan. It is envisioned that the system will be capable of waypoint
navigation to both pre-planned and ad-hoc waypoints, can loiter or hover depending on
the vehicle type, can navigate terrain, and can operate attached sensors at designated
waypoints per the mission requirements. Mission tasks that should be accomplished in
order to meet the desired capabilities of the system include:
1.

Loiter or hover about a waypoint or navigate to a sequence of waypoints
while providing real-time radiological strength measurements to the
ground control station. Video imagery from search should be recorded
and displayed to the ground control station in real-time. Video options will
be available for both daytime and low-light conditions, with enough
quality for the ground control station operator to detect human figures
based on the displayed imagery. The operator will designate a target
search area with the ground control station software and the system will
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search the designated target area based on vehicle telemetry, with a
desired accuracy of 15 meters distance root mean squared (DRMS). The
initial search should yield calculated location(s) of radiological source
material based upon maximum radiation readings and telemetry data. The
system should be capable of displaying a radiological strength contour
map of the target area to the ground control station operator.
2.

Navigate to a waypoint and hover, land, or dwell at the location while
providing real-time video imagery to the ground control station. Video
imagery should be recorded and displayed to the ground control station in
real-time. The operator will designate the target location(s) calculated
from the initial area search. Once at a designated target location, the
system will confirm the detected radiological sources by collecting a
gamma spectrum of the source material. Spectrum data will be provided
to the ground control station and the system will predict the radioisotopes
based off the measured gamma energies.

3.

Traverse the exterior wall faces of an urban structure, covering both the
horizontal and vertical extent of a building. The system should employ
terrain avoidance while maintaining a safe distance from a structure in
order to avoid damage to or loss of a vehicle. The desired location
accuracy of 15 meters DRMS is driven by the need to avoid collateral
damage in urban environments. While traversing the exterior wall faces of
a building, the system will record radiation strength measurements at
39

locations adjacent to the walls. These radiation measurements will be
used to develop a three-dimensional contour map to pinpoint probable
locations for the source material.
4.

Perform a commanded ditch or crash maneuver in the event of system
faults or circumstances making recovery impossible or undesirable, such
as unavoidable contact with hostile personnel or compromise of the
system. Each system vehicle will encompass a self-destruct module to
make the system unusable if seized by unfriendly forces.

5.

Perform a return to launch (RTL) at any time during operation. An RTL
will return the vehicle to a pre-programmed location where it will perform
the recovery phase.
Recovery Phase

This phase involves recovering the vehicles upon completion of the mission or as
deemed necessary. The UVs should be capable of navigating to a recovery location
designated by the ground control station operator. Unassisted takeoff and landing of air
vehicles are desirable if done safely and to ensure rapid recovery and reuse of the vehicle.
Batteries must be replaceable in the field and additional fuel should be available for
sequential search or continuing large area search or surveillance operations.
System Decomposition
Use Cases
A use case model for the system has been developed using Cameo Systems
Modeler to visualize the main operational functions that the system needs to perform, as
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well as the interactions the system has with actors, external systems, and the environment
(Figure 6). The use cases are based on mission needs, enabling capabilities, and
scenarios previously mentioned. The entire system is responsible for performing setup,
planning the mission, deploying and ingress, performing search and confirmation
activities, egressing and recovery, and self-destruction if necessary. Several use cases
require interactions with the GNSS, the physical environment, and human operators,

Figure 6. Use case model for the radiological search system
whereas the target radiological source material only relates to performing search and
confirmation. The use cases holistically provide the necessary functions to execute the
entire spectrum of the radiological search mission, as determined by the CONOPS. The
details of the individual use cases can be found in Appendix B.
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Tasks, Attributes, and Measures
Within the confines of the radiological search mission, there are basic tasks that
must be accomplished as part of mission execution. The tasks, along with the associated
attributes and measures, can be seen in Table 4. This list highlights important variables
Table 4. Mission-level key tasks, attributes, and measures
Task

Attribute

Measure

Duration [min]
Search
Coverage
Total area searched [m²]
Area coverage rate [m²/s]
Probability of detection [%]
Detect
Accurate
False alarm rate [alarms/mission]
DRMS absolute location error [m]
Navigate
Accurate
DRMS relative location error [m]
Secure
Encrypted/not encrypted
Communicate
Range
Range [m]
Spectral resolution
Resolution [% FWHM]
Confirm
Source position accuracy DRMS location error [m]
Workload
Minimum crew size required [# personnel]
Mission-wide
Mission turn time [min]
Availability
Mission ready rate [% mission capable]

that apply to the mission. The tasks are essential for executing the individual use cases,
and therefore meeting the intent established in the CONOPS. The attributes and
measures capture what can be considered significant measurable data for task evaluation
if system development were to occur. It should be noted that the list does not encompass
all tasks that need to be performed nor all measures that should be considered for
evaluation. Additionally, there are some attributes and measures that apply across all
mission tasks, which are combined in a “mission-wide” task category. The major tasks
42

for mission completion are search, detection, navigation, communication, and
confirmation. The established mission-level tasks feed MOEs for the radiological search
mission and the expected operating environmental conditions [32]. From there, systemspecific MOPs were developed including measurable performance factors for evaluating
the MOEs. The MOPs are related to the task attributes and the attributes’ measures
correspond to performance parameters. The list of developed MOEs, MOPs, and
performance parameters are in Table 5. As mentioned previously, the MOEs, MOPs, and
performance parameters are not exhaustive and provide an academic assessment of
critical data that should be measured to assess system performance against mission
execution.
Table 5. MOEs with system-specific MOPs and performance parameters
MOE

MOP

Performance Parameters

Location accuracy of
radiological source(s)
Success rate of locating
and identifying
radiological source
material in a 3 square
kilometer search area

Confirmation accuracy of
radiological isotope(s)
Endurance
Area coverage rate
Degree of autonomy
Video imagery resolution

Ability to communicate
data to a remotecontrol point across a
3-kilometer distance

Data processing speed
Data encryption
Transmission range
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Detector dead time [ms]
Detector dose rate range [mSv]
DRMS relative location error [m]
DRMS absolute location error [m]
Spectrum resolution [%]
Minimum energy detected [keV]
Maximum energy detected [keV]
Weight [kg]
Power capacity [W]
Camera FOV [°]
Operating altitude [m]
Vehicle cruise speed [m/s]
Autonomy scale [Figure 5]
Ground sample distance [m]
GCS processing speed [GHz]
Data transmission rate [Mbps]
Y/N
Tx power [dB]
Rx power [dB]

Functional Decomposition and Physical Allocation
Continuing with the system hierarchy, the functional decomposition and
allocation of physical componentry can be produced. For the purposes of this research,
the CONOPS identified system requirements are based on assumptions and personal
knowledge of the radiological search mission space. This is unlike traditional processes
where requirements are identified by operational users of a conceptualized system [28].
The requirements as presented herein are traceable to the use cases, tasks, attributes,
measures, and now to the functional decomposition and physical architecture of the
system. Individual tasks are essential for the completion of the different scenarios
mentioned in the CONOPS as well as for the execution of each use case. A
conglomeration of all derived tasks for a vehicle and the GCS can be seen in Table 6.
Table 6. Derived system tasks between vehicle and GCS
Vehicle Activities

GCS Activities

Auto land
Load MP
Analyze spectrum data
Auto takeoff
Loiter
Calculate target coord
Capture video
Navigate waypoints Combine rad data/telemetry
Collect rad data
Send rad data
Connect to vehicle
Collect rad spectrum Send spectrum data Construct MP
Conduct BIT
Send telemetry
Create rad map
Follow search pattern Send video
Display rad data
Initiate search
Trigger self-destruct Display rad map
Display rad spectrum
Display radionuclide
Display target coord
Display telemetry

Display video
Receive MP status
Receive rad data
Receive spectrum data
Receive telemetry
Send cmd
Store rad data
Store spectrum data
Store target coord
Store telemetry
Store video
Write MP

The functional decomposition has been split at the system level into vehicle activities and
GCS activities, represented in the MBSE format in Figure 7. For this research, the
vehicle activities generally apply to and cover all activities for the ground, fixed-wing,
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Figure 7. System functional decomposition
and multirotor UVs. The activities for the various vehicles are broken down into
performing controlled movement, autopilot function, vehicle data communications,
radiation measurement, and providing video (Figure 8).

Figure 8. Generic vehicle functional decomposition
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For the ground control station, the functional decomposition is categorized by processing,
providing data communication with system vehicles, providing interface and output for
the GCS operator, and receiving video from vehicles. The GCS sends commands to
system vehicles, receives and displays video, and receives, processes, and displays
critical flight and radiation measurement data (Figure 9).

Figure 9. GCS functional decomposition
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The physical architecture consists of singular components, organized into system
modules, that fulfill the execution of tasks listed in the vehicle and GCS functional
decompositions (Figure 10-13). The vehicle modules are navigation, payload, power,
self-destruct, and the vehicle itself. The subsystem breakdowns are not exhaustive lists

Figure 10. Multirotor physical architecture

Figure 11. Fixed-wing physical architecture
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Figure 12. Ground vehicle physical architecture

Figure 13. Ground control station physical architecture
of all physical hardware but include major components that should be considered for
future design and sizing. It should be noted that the power modules for the multirotor
and fixed-wing vehicles contain both batteries and gasoline-based engines, which will be
discussed later in Chapter IV. Additionally, there is no power system listed for the
ground control station, as this will be powered by the transport vehicle used to deploy the
system and human operators.
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From the different physical architectures, the subsystem components can be
allocated against all system tasks from the functional decomposition. Allocating each
individual task against each component within the system continues the traceability from
the CONOPS, to the use cases, to the tasks, and lastly to the physical hierarchy of the
system. An allocation of each activity to a subsystem component satisfies this
traceability (Table 7). Each activity that is necessary for mission completion is being
satisfied by at least one component or one subsystem module. The individual vehicle and
GCS physical allocation matrices can be found at Appendix A. By categorizing the
subsystems, the physical components, and the executable tasks, a simplified analysis for
potential hardware redundancy is possible.
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↗

Analyze spectrum data
Auto land

↗

↗

↗

Auto takeoff

↗

↗

↗
↗

Calculate target coord

Rad Search GCS

Rad Search Multirotor

Rad Search Ground Vehicle

Rad Search Fixed-Wing

Legend
Allocated - ↗

Rad Search GCS

Rad Search Multirotor

Rad Search Ground Vehicle

Legend
Allocated - ↗

Rad Search Fixed-Wing

Table 7. System physical allocation matrix

↗

Perform GCS activities
Perform rad measurement

↗

↗

↗

Perform rad search activities

↗

↗

↗

Perform vehicle activities

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

Capture video

↗

↗

↗

Perform vehicle data comm

Collect rad data

↗

↗

↗

Process

↗

↗

↗

Provide data comm w/ vehicle

↗

Provide I/O w/ GCS operator

↗

Collect rad spectrum

↗

Combine rad data/telemetry
Conduct BIT

↗

↗

↗

Connect to GCS

↗

↗

↗

Provide video

↗

↗

↗

Receive cmd

↗

↗

↗

Connect to vehicle

↗

Receive MP status

↗

Construct MP

↗

Receive rad data

↗

Create rad map

↗

Receive spectrum data

↗

Display MP status

↗

Receive telemetry

↗

Display rad data

↗

Receive video

↗

Display rad map

↗

Report MP load status

Display rad spectrum

↗

Send cmd

Display radionuclide

↗

Send rad data

Display target coord

↗

Send spectrum data

Display telemetry

↗

Send telemetry

↗

↗

Send video

↗

Display video
↗

↗

↗

Load MP

↗

↗

↗

Loiter

↗

↗

Navigate waypoints

↗

↗

Perform autopilot functions

↗

Perform controlled movement ↗

Follow search pattern

↗

↗

↗
↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

Store rad data

↗

Store spectrum data

↗

Store target coord

↗

↗

Store telemetry

↗

↗

Store video

↗

↗

↗

Trigger self-destruct actuator ↗

↗

↗

Write MP

↗

Initiate search
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↗

↗
↗

Design Considerations
There are several avenues for system design based on the established CONOPS
and system decomposition. These include similar and dissimilar componentry as well as
factors that could attribute to certain design decisions such as payload type, processing
capabilities, and the operating environment. In order to evaluate the system
componentry, the three vehicle systems and the ground control station were assessed. A
comparison of subsystem components and their equivalent to other systems is shown in
Table 8, identifying hardware that can use similar components, hardware that is similar
but likely use different components, and hardware that is dissimilar.
Similar Componentry
After a rudimentary comparison, it is evident that there are multiple overlapping
components in the payload, navigation, and power modules, as well as the self-destruct
package. Due to the assumed simplicity of the system concept and maximizing existing
COTS and GOTS hardware, equivalent components should be selected in order to
duplicate the capability of each component within the overarching system. This creates
redundancy throughout the system, enabling the cannibalization of one vehicle system in
order to make another system fully operational. For instance, similar modem components
should be incorporated for transmitting telemetry data, payload data, and video stream.
Redundant hardware facilitates the interchange of system components with little to no reprogramming if operational constraints arise. This can be crucial to operators if they are
limited on spare parts or if geographically separated from the main operating location by
providing the ability to troubleshoot a subsystem when hardware becomes inoperable.
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Table 8. Comparison analysis of subsystem componentry
Component
N
A
V
I
G
A
T
I
O
N

Fixed-Wing Multirotor

Ground

GCS

Autopilot
Autopilot Modem
GPS/Compass
Pitot Sensor
Distance Sensor
Camera

P
A
Y
L
O
A
D

Gimbal
Payload Modem
Radiation Detector
Video Transmitter
Spectrum Collector
Battery
Fuel Tank
Gas Generator

P
O
W
E
R

Ignition
Ignition Power Switch
Optical Kill Switch
Power Distribution Board
Wiring

S
D

Self-Destruct Package
Electronic Speed Controller
Air Frame

V
E
H
I
C
L
E

Propeller
Servo
Articulator Arm
Ground Vehicle Chassis
Motor
Multirotor Frame
Antenna Tracker
GCS Computer

G
C
S

GCS Software
GPS Base Station
Radiation Processing/Mapping Software
Video Receiver

Similar component, could be same
Similar component, likely different
Different component
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The decision to swap components from one system to another is driven by mission and
scenario need. For example, intelligence identifies a single building as the target location
for a radiological source. This would not require the use of a fixed-wing UV since a large
area search is not needed. The components of the fixed-wing UV can be cannibalized in
order to ensure mission execution with the other two system vehicles. On the contrary, a
large area search requires a fixed-wing UV for initial detection of the radiological
material. However, the fixed-wing UV can be disassembled after initial detection is
complete, the search area has been narrowed, and when follow-on search and
identification can be managed by the multirotor or ground vehicle. Hardware redundancy
provides the flexibility to prioritize and execute mission needs when necessary.
Hardware Variations
There are also multiple componentry differences amongst the vehicle systems and
the ground control station. Modules with major variations from other systems include
power production, the ground control station, and the vehicle itself. As is anticipated, the
vehicle chassis will be dissimilar for the various UVs. This includes the vehicle
propulsion system, which consists of the motors (electric and gasoline-fueled), servos,
propellers, and wheel tracks. The last distinctive vehicle component is an articulator arm
on the ground vehicle, which can be used for object manipulation and as an extra
mounting point for vehicle payloads.
In order to meet the system’s intent of searching large areas as well as carrying
payloads in excess of 15 pounds (6.8 kilograms), the power plants for the different
vehicles cannot be restricted to battery-powered systems. Other options to be considered
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include small combustion engines and hybrid-electric motors. The fixed-wing vehicle is
required to accomplish an initial search to localize where radiological material is located,
with the potential to continue operations as a surveillance asset. Due to the potential for
long-duration flights, this capability is best supported using a combustion engine in lieu
of batteries to drive the propeller. A gasoline engine will enable flight times of several
hours and increases the required size of the vehicle, which is beneficial for payload
capacity. Battery-powered fixed-wing vehicles can achieve flight durations over 1 hour
but will not be able to carry equivalent payload weights with comparable endurance times
to gasoline-powered systems. Comparatively, a battery-powered multirotor system
would not have the endurance to cover all potential source locations within a 3 square
kilometer area for collection of a gamma spectrum. A hybrid-electric system would
provide greater endurance and offers an increased payload capacity compared to batterypowered multirotor vehicles. Battery-powered systems of the desired sizing are typically
limited to 30-minute flight times, which is insufficient for carrying detector payloads to
the farthest sites of a large search area. Additionally, batteries can take 30 minutes to an
hour for recharging if spare batteries are unavailable, which can hamper the ability to
execute consecutive sorties. Endurance estimates supporting the above discussion can be
found later in Chapter IV. Opting for fuel-based power systems is ideal for providing
longer endurance due to a higher energy density compared to battery technology, which
can be visualized in Figure 14. Utilizing liquid fuels for the fixed-wing and multirotor
UVs will increase flight durations, area coverage, and maximum allowable payload,
optimizing performance of these systems and providing optionality for other uses such
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Figure 14. Energy density comparison of several transportation fuels (indexed to
gasoline = 1) [35]
as surveillance missions.
In addition to the detector payloads, additional payloads should be included on
vehicles to assist with navigation and surveillance. Light detection and ranging (LiDAR)
or other distance measuring sensors should be incorporated on the multirotor to provide
accurate navigation when flying around buildings and other potential obstacles. This will
provide more accurate radiation measurements and enhanced safety by decreasing the
likelihood that a collision occurs. Additionally, the fixed-wing UV could benefit from a
higher quality video camera compared to cameras installed on the other vehicles. The
fixed-wing’s optionality to provide aerial surveillance would benefit from high-quality
video and would better support ground operators.
Physical Limitations and Imposed Design
System components are constrained to the mission needs listed in the CONOPS
and limited to the operational requirements of the mission area. Two important
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limitations to highlight are the restrictions on system mass and the extended endurance
required to cover a 3 square kilometer search area. The two limitations drive the sizing
of each subsystem vehicle, their power plants, and the quantity of vehicles utilized in the
system. A minimum of three unmanned vehicles (fixed-wing, multirotor, and ground), a
ground control station, and the accompanying storage, power, communications, and
maintenance equipment must be containable in a truck and trailer for system deployment.
Additionally, due to the nature of radiation emissions discussed in Chapter II, detector
payloads are more likely to detect gamma radiations when closer to the radiological
source material. This negates the viability of using large unmanned vehicles that operate
at higher altitudes such as the RQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper that are categorized as
DoD UAS Group 4 and Group 5 systems (Table 3).
On-board processing has been removed from the conceptualized design in the
physical architecture. This capability requires additional vehicle power and produces
unwanted heat, which would reduce mission endurance and could present overheating
issues in warmer operating environments. Additionally, an on-board processor
introduces the risk of leaking sensitive information regarding system software and
vulnerabilities to adversarial forces if captured or ditched in a contested area. This will
be discussed in more detail later in Chapter IV.
Power
As discussed previously, power production can be an issue for the fixed-wing and
multirotor platforms. This is dependent on payload selection for the system and the
required flight endurance for the individual vehicles. A liquid-fuel engine for the fixed56

wing would increase the size of the vehicle but would greatly improve the endurance and
the payload capacity. Similarly, a hybrid-electric motor for the multirotor would have a
comparable effect. However, using combustion engines would increase the complexity of
the system regarding mechanical components and potential maintenance. Furthermore, a
deployable system may be constrained by available types of fuel. DoD Directive 4180.01
promotes the use of multiple energy sources for weapon systems and equipment, where
appropriate, and becoming operational with one battlefield fuel [36]. Typical small
combustion engines used on fixed-wing and multirotor vehicles consume 91 octane fuel
or higher [25]. Expeditionary vehicles, aerospace generation equipment, and power
generation assets are typically fueled with diesel or jet propellant-8 (JP-8). Expanding
the capabilities of the system to utilize heavy fuels, if combustion engines are chosen for
power generation, would provide more options for system deployment and would reduce
vulnerabilities if 91 octane fuel is unavailable. Small two-stroke gasoline engines (10
cm³ to 100 cm³) have been proven to run on heavy fuels with minimal degradation to
peak performance power. However, this required engine modifications such as replacing
carburetors with throttle body fuel injection systems and changing stock engine control
units to adjustable ignition timing maps [37].
In addition to meeting endurance and payload capacity, adequate power needs to
be generated or supplied on-board in order to power video cameras, navigation systems,
and payloads. The largest payload consumer of power would be gas-filled detectors and
semiconductor detectors, which operate at higher voltages. With this being the case, it is
advisable to power these detectors with separate power supplies. Utilizing separate
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power supplies for all detector payloads would enable optionality for handheld use and
would reduce the complexity and drain on the vehicle’s power system. It is possible to
power these systems, but this also increases the size of the combustion engine and the
vehicle frame to support the engine. A good example is the Airborg H8 10K Hybrid
UAS. It claims a flight endurance of 1 hour carrying a 22-pound (10-kilogram) payload,
with a power output of 100 watts and built-in 5 voltage direct current (VDC) and 12 VDC
wiring. The longest dimension of the vehicle is 6.4 feet (1.95 meters) and the total
weight with a 22-pound payload is 110 pounds (50 kilograms) [38]. This would be
sufficient voltage for the Ortec Micro-Detective, which requires 10 to 17 VDC for
operation [19].
Environmental
The operating environment of this system is important to understand since
operations will primarily be outside. Many common components used for unmanned
vehicles are designed for use in -20° to 50° Celsius temperatures, but some components,
such as the Ortec Micro-Detective, may have a smaller temperature window for operation
[19], [25], [26], [39]. Other components that may be affected are batteries and circuit
boards. Extreme cold weather can reduce the overall power output of a battery, whereas
extreme heat can lead to physical damage. On-board processing equipment such as
autopilot systems and detector payloads can also be affected by hot weather, causing
damage to circuity and decreased performance. Desired operating temperatures for the
system could affect component selection and design for each vehicle.
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In addition to temperature constraints, other weather constraints could affect the
operational utility of the system. Visual capabilities could be limited by fog,
precipitation, smog, and sunlight. Unless night vision video cameras or other imaging
solutions are utilized, night operations would be dangerous or not viable. Additionally,
precipitation may affect system functions, either from individual component
waterproofing or physical limitations of vehicle propulsion. Lastly, flying vehicles must
maintain stable flight while airborne. Strong steady and gusting winds would limit the
use of flying vehicles, with the wind limits being better defined during system design.
The last environmental concern is from obstacles and human interference. The
operating area may contain trees and buildings that could impede flying operations, or
uneven terrain such as ditches and rocks for a ground vehicle. Design considerations
should be made to mitigate these risks, such as the addition of specific payloads to see
and avoid terrain or the ability to traverse uneven ground with the addition of extendable
wheels or tracks. Additionally, the human element can interrupt vehicle operations.
Threats can be in the form of thrown rocks, nets, vehicle theft, small arms fire, or manportable air defense systems. There are few design decisions that can currently mitigate
these threats, but technology is continuously progressing and the capability to avoid
human threats may present itself in the future.
Detector Payload
In order to optimize the performance of the radiological search system, detectors
for initial detection and spectrum collection should be evaluated separately. It is valid to
employ multiple detector technologies due to the diversity of radiological search
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scenarios. Detector selection can vary due to several reasons: 1) detector selection can
be driven by the type of area to be searched; 2) detector selection can be dictated by the
size of area to be searched; 3) detector selection is limited by the vehicle it will be
deployed on; and 4) detector selection can be determined by the desired mission outcome.
Gas-filled detectors are well suited for area surveying during initial searches.
More specifically, the higher applied voltage in G-M detectors results in a sensitive
detector, which is ideal for large area searches that may require detection from long
distances [14]. Additionally, typical COTS G-M detectors have higher radiation dose
rate thresholds. The high threshold enables G-M detectors to avoid detector saturation
when in strong radiation fields, and therefore continue to function and provide radiation
strength readings [19]. This results in a more defined geolocation of source material after
the initial search. However, G-M detectors do not measure the energy of incident gamma
rays, which can be important for determining health and safety concerns for responding
personnel.
Scintillators can also be used for area searches but tend to have lower radiation
dose rate thresholds [19]. This translates to detector saturation in strong radiation fields
where G-M detectors could still be operating, resulting in a less accurate geolocation than
G-M technologies. However, both scintillators and semiconductors are well suited for
gamma spectrum collection because they can distinguish between different energies of
incident gamma rays, allowing for the identification of radioisotopes. Scintillators are
cheap and lightweight but produce low resolution spectrums. On the contrary,
semiconductors are expensive and heavy due to the required cooling systems that
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maintain low operating temperatures but provide very high-resolution spectrums [21].
Equipping the system with multiple technologies gives the capability for high-resolution
spectrums, but the optionality to use the less expensive and lighter scintillator in
unfavorable conditions.
The vehicle type can determine payload selection. For instance, a spectrum
collection payload is not ideal for deploying on a fixed-wing vehicle. Spectrum
collection should be completed at a constant distance from a radioisotope and in a stable
position. A fixed-wing vehicle is unable to maintain a constant distance during flight but
is well-suited for searching large areas when the location of source material is unknown.
The optimal payload for a fixed-wing vehicle is a G-M detector due to its sensitivity, but
scintillators are also a practical option. Terrain and environmental conditions can force a
fixed-wing UV to fly over one hundred meters AGL, making higher-sensitivity detectors
more desirable for initial detection. For isotope identification, the current government
“gold standard” for gamma spectroscopy is a liquid or electromechanically cooled high
purity germanium crystal [40]. This setup provides a superior resolution spectrum
compared to existing scintillator technology but may not be feasible on a multirotor or
ground vehicle due to weight limitations and the operating environment.
The physical and immediate surroundings of each vehicle should also be assessed.
The two main considerations for detector mounting are material interactions and
susceptibility to impact. Interactions with other vehicle materials can include vibrationinduced gamma counts, gamma counts produced from other on-board electronic
equipment, and self-imposed shielding. Unintentional shielding can happen when an
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intervening material from a vehicle is between the detector media and the radiological
source. The intervening material can weaken or alter the gamma energies incident on the
detector, ultimately decreasing the potential for initial detection and degrading the
accuracy of spectrum collection [19]. Similarly, shielding material may need to be
utilized between the detector and other electronic hardware in order to reduce false
gamma readings that occur from other types of electromagnetic radiation. The other
physical consideration is the potential for detector impact. Collision with obstacles,
human interactions, and harsh landings can affect detector performance and can dictate
payload attachment and hardening design. Depending on the detector and the vehicle,
attachment options can be limited due to size and weight. Vehicle center of gravity
constraints and chassis strength will drive mounting options to ensure that vehicles safely
fly and maneuver as designed. Detector hardening may also be limited due to vehicle
payload capacity but should be evaluated during system design.
One last consideration for payload selection is the additional capability for the
detectors to be used in a handheld configuration by the system’s human operators.
Situations may present themselves where the initial search, the spectrum collection, or
both methods are not appropriate for unmanned vehicles. Terrain, environmental
conditions, and other on-scene factors can differ from provided intelligence. Once an
operational team arrives at the search location, it may be logical to modify the mission
plan to conduct a portion of or the entire mission using personnel search teams.
Depending on their equipping, they may need the capability to conduct searches with the
same equipment deployed on the UV system. Commonly used GOTS and COTS
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handheld detectors can vary in price from $1,000 to $100,000, which is contingent on the
type of technology purchased [39]. It may be more cost effective to include handheldoperable equipment in the system. This would limit the overall detector acquisition cost
to the end user, avoiding the need for redundant technologies that are dedicated to either a
UV system or a human operator. If handheld detectors are employed, it is essential that
the detector’s human interface can be bypassed in order to send data and receive
commands. A commonly used COTS semiconductor detector designed for handheld use
is the Ortec Micro-Detective. As previously mentioned, it utilizes an HPGe crystal to
provide a spectral resolution of less than one percent. The purchase price for this
equipment is upwards of $100,000 but provides the highest-quality gamma spectrum
compared to other spectrum-collection technologies. With a weight of 15 pounds (6.8
kilograms), this equipment is only suitable for the ground UV and for short-duration trips
with a large multirotor [19]. However, including this piece of equipment also enables the
human operator to collect a high-resolution spectrum if the mission dictates.
Additionally, there are many COTS handheld detectors that come equipped with G-M
and scintillation technology [19]. This could increase the efficiency of a mission by
completing the initial search and radioisotope identification with one vehicle trip, thus
avoiding payload exchange when a high-resolution spectrum is not required. This is only
practical on the ground and multirotor UVs due to the constant distance required for
spectrum collection. The flexibility of equipping the UV system with handheld
technology increases the probability of mission success regardless of evolving or
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unforeseen circumstances. Table 1Table 9summarizes considerations for UV detector
selection in order to meet operational needs.
Table 9. Vehicle and detector compatibility selection

Limitations

Advantages
Suitable
Technologies
Detector
Selection
Criteria

Ground
Terrain/obstacles
Slow
2-D coverage
Dwell time/stability
Manipulator arm
Heavy payload
Gas-filled
Scintillator
Semiconductor

Multirotor
Endurance
Payload weight

Fixed-wing
No dwell

3-D coverage
Large area coverage
Accessibility
Long endurance
Hover/land for stability Aerial surveillance
Gas-filled
Gas-filled
Scintillator
Scintillator
Semiconductor
Mission requirement
Desired performance
Environmental conditions
Permissibility

Communication Modems & On-board Processing
As mentioned in the similar componentry assessment, comparable communication
modem pairs could be used to provide redundancy and flexibility throughout the system
if hardware becomes inoperable. Additionally, on-board processors have been removed
from the Cameo physical decomposition to reduce power-draw, weight, heat, and to
avoid sensitive data exploitation if a vehicle is lost or stolen. If vehicle on-board
processors are included during system design and testing, multiple modems may not be
necessary for each vehicle. However, in order to capture, combine, and encrypt multiple
payload data and video feeds, a custom communication modem and processor may be
required that is not available commercially or through existing government PORs.
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The development of a custom communication modem and processor will depend
on the established requirements, payload selection, and discoveries during the design and
testing phases. The system needs the ability to communicate amongst a GCS and
multiple UVs while encrypting and combining data streams, and also providing the
flexibility for future payloads to be added to the system. There may not be a component
that will satisfy system demands and be available commercially. Sourced payload
manufacturers may not have compatible output data and could pose problems when
sending or processing different data packet types and lengths. These reasons could force
a requirement for on-board processing to assist with data management before
communicating from a vehicle to the GCS. The on-board processor could be integrated
with a communication platform that is equipped on each UV and the GCS. This could
solve issues posed by data compatibility, encryption, data combination, and time
synchronization. A solution for these issues would most likely necessitate a customdesigned component in order to function properly, as well as provide the flexibility to for
additional payloads and other mission areas.
Processing Software
In addition to a custom-designed communication and processing package, custom
software will likely need to be developed. This includes software on the GCS platform as
well as software for the on-board processors. Vehicle software should be capable of
combining data from various payloads and the autopilot before relaying the information
to the GCS. Simultaneously, the software must decipher commands received from the
GCS before relaying the commands to the appropriate vehicle components. On the
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ground, GCS software provides input and output functionality to the GCS operator. The
software should be able to merge pertinent data received from a vehicle autopilot,
detector payload, and video camera into one visual interface. It should have the
capability to display real-time radiological data, display a three-dimensional radiological
strength contour map of the search area, and provide source location estimates from the
combined radiation data and telemetry data (Figure 15). Additionally, the software

Figure 15. 3-D radiation strength map (left) of a vehicle search pattern (right) [41]
should provide real-time and planned vehicle locations on a map, similar to existing
autopilot software suites. Lastly, the software should provide command options for both
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vehicle navigation and payload functions, such as starting and stopping spectrum
collection, controlling camera gimbals and articulator arms, and being able to toggle
between autonomous and controlled movement.
Analysis of Feasibility and Utility
After progressing through concept development, applicable scenarios, a task and
physical decomposition of the system, and design considerations, the overarching query
remains whether the system would be practical to employ and what utility it could
provide to the radiological search mission and other mission areas. The concept
system’s abilities can be fundamentally evaluated through sizing and endurance
estimations for multirotor and fixed-wing UVs. Ground vehicles are more forgiving with
payload capacity, and therefore will not be analyzed due to the several COTS options that
meet example payload requirements [42], [43], [44].
Air vehicle sizing and performance will be centered on assumptions founded upon
similarly sized UAS specifications and incorporating handheld detector weights where
appropriate. Assumptions are made for component sizes, efficiency ratings, air speeds,
and mass fractions based on AFIT professor knowledge, existing literature, and existing
COTS systems [45], [45], [46]. Mass fractions (𝑀𝐹 ) are typically tracked for vehicle
payloads and for power sources (i.e. battery, fuel), and provide thresholds for vehicle
estimates. The mass fractions for unmanned vehicles typically fall within the same
range, with the fuel mass fraction ranging from 0.2 to 0.3 and the payload ranging from
0.1 to 0.3 [45]. Mass fractions can be estimated using Equation 2.
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𝑀𝐹𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 =

𝑊𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡

(2)

𝑊𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑜𝑓𝑓

Incorporating handheld detectors would be the worst-case scenario for payload weight
and size due to the additional weight from ruggedized cases and integrated power
supplies, but it also gauges the feasibility of employing handheld detectors on UV
platforms. Custom-designed detectors can be a fraction of the weight but typically do not
include power sources, hardening, or user interfaces for handheld operation. Example
payloads will be used for multirotor sizing, whereas fixed-wing vehicles will use mass
fractions and total takeoff weight to determine system endurance.

Electric Multirotor Sizing
Multirotor sizing is estimated from derived power equations related to current
draw and battery capacity that can maintain the vehicle in a constant hover. The power
required for each prop (𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝 ) is dependent on vehicle mass (m), the area and efficiency
of the prop (𝐴𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝 , 𝜂𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝 ), the number of motors (𝑛𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 ), and the density of air (𝜌𝑎𝑖𝑟 )
(Equation 3) [45], [46].

𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝 =

2∙𝐴𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝∙𝜌𝑎𝑖𝑟
𝜂𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝

3

∙ (√

𝑚∙𝑔
2∙𝐴𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝∙𝜌𝑎𝑖𝑟 ∙𝑛𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠

)

(3)

The power required for each prop to maintain hover determines the current required for
each motor (𝐼𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟 ), which also depends on the battery voltage (𝑉𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦 ) and the motor
efficiency (𝜂𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟 ) (Equation 4) [46].
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𝐼𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟 =

𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝
𝑉𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦 ∙𝜂𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟

(4)

The total current (𝐼𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 ) required for vehicle operation is found using the total number of
motors (𝑛𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 ) and additional current requirements (𝐼𝑎𝑢𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 ) (Equation 5) [46].

𝐼𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 𝐼𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟 ∙ 𝑛𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝐼𝑎𝑢𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦

(5)

In order to determine the UV’s endurance (𝐸), the usable battery capacity (𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 ) has
to be calculated by using the rated capacity of the battery (𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 ), the efficiency of the
battery (𝜂𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦 ), the permissible battery discharge depth (𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 ), and the number of
batteries (𝑛𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 ) (Equations 6-7) [46].

𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 = 𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∙ 𝜂𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦 ∙ 𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 ∙ 𝑛𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝐸=

𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒
𝐼𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙

(6)

(7)

Sizing was calculated for electric DoD UAS Group 1 and Group 2 multirotor
vehicles. The Group 1 multirotor was estimated to carry a FLIR IdentiFINDER R400NG, which has a NaI(Tl) scintillator for dose rate measurement and radioisotope
identification and a G-M tube for high radiation field dose rate equivalence. This
payload adds 1.2 kilograms to the overall mass with dimensions of 24.9 centimeters × 9.4
centimeters × 7.6 centimeters and an 8-hour runtime on internal batteries [19]. A Tarot
T960 hexacopter frame with Tarot 5008-340KV motors were used for mass and power
estimates. Including two 10 ampere-hour 6-cell lithium polymer (LiPo) batteries to the
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system, the overall mass is 9 kilograms, which is within the threshold for Group 1 UAS.
Hovering at this weight produces an overall endurance of 20 minutes. A summary of the
input data and results can be found at Table 10.
Table 10. Group 1 electric multirotor endurance estimate
Payload mass [kg]
Mass w/out batteries/payload [kg]
Gravity [m/s²]
Air density [kg/m³]
Prop diameter [in]
Prop diameter [m]
Prop efficiency
Motor efficiency
# battery cells
Rated battery capacity [Ah]
Battery voltage [volts]
Battery mass [kg]
# batteries
Battery efficiency
Permissible battery discharge
Usable battery capacity [Ah]
# motors
Motor mass [g]
Auxiliary current [A]
Total mass [kg]
Power required per prop [W]
Current required per motor [A]
Total current [A]
Endurance [min]

1.2
5.3
9.86
1.2
18
0.46
0.8
0.8
6
10
22.2
1.32
2
0.9
0.8
14.4
6
168
5
9
115.9
6.5
44.2
19.6

The Group 2 multirotor was estimated to carry an Ortec Micro-Detective-DX,
which uses an HPGe semiconductor and electromechanical Stirling-cycle cooler for dose
rate measurement and high-resolution identification. This payload adds 6.8 kilograms to
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the overall mass with dimensions of 37.3 centimeters × 14.6 centimeters × 27.9
centimeters and a 5-hour runtime on its lithium-ion battery pack [19]. A Tarot T960
hexacopter frame with T-Motor-U7-420KV motors were used for mass and power
estimates. Including three 10 ampere-hour 6-cell LiPo batteries to the system, the overall
mass is 16.7 kilograms, which is 6 kilograms below the Group 3 UAS threshold.
However, it should be noted that the total mass exceeds the recommended 15-kilogram
design threshold for the frame [47]. This estimate, although not advisable for design
purposes, provides a best-case operating endurance using the lightweight frame and
heavy payload. Even with these risky operating parameters, hovering at this weight only
produces an endurance of 13 minutes. A summary of the data and results can be found at
Table 11.
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Table 11. Group 2 electric multirotor endurance estimate
Payload mass [kg]
Mass w/out batteries [kg]
Gravity [m/s²]
Air density [kg/m³]
Prop diameter [in]
Prop diameter [m]
Prop efficiency
Motor efficiency
# battery cells
Rated battery capacity [Ah]
Battery voltage [volts]
Battery mass [kg]
# batteries
Battery efficiency
Permissible battery discharge
Usable battery capacity [Ah]
# motors
Motor mass [g]
Auxiliary current [A]
Total mass [kg]
Power required per prop [W]
Current required per motor [A]
Total current [A]
Endurance [min]

6.8
5.9
9.86
1.2
18
0.46
0.8
0.8
6
10
22.2
1.32
3
0.9
0.8
21.6
6
255
5
16.7
285.3
16.1
101.4
12.8

Hybrid-electric Multirotor Sizing
Group 1 and Group 2 electric multirotors provide short endurance flights, which
limits their application to cover small search areas. Therefore, an estimate was
completed of a Group 2 hybrid-electric multirotor that uses a gasoline generator to charge
a LiPo battery to power the motors. The gasoline provides a higher specific energy while
the battery provides a simpler and more reliable method for throttling power to the six
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electric motors. The same Ortec Micro-Detective-DX payload was used, but this time a
GAIA 160 Elite Pro 2.4 kilowatt hybrid-electric drone was used as a baseline system
[48]. The same power equation (Equation 3) was used to determine the power required
per prop, which was then totaled for the entire system. The gas generator can supply a
constant 2.4 kilowatts of power at a fuel burn rate of 2.5 liters per hour. This allows for
an endurance of 58 minutes when flying with 3 liters of fuel and retaining 20% of fuel at
the end of mission. Results from the estimation are detailed in Table 12.
Table 12. Group 2 hybrid-electric multirotor endurance estimate
Payload mass [kg]
Mass fraction payload
Generator system mass [kg]
Mass w/out payload [kg]
Gas density [kg/L]
Fuel capacity [L]
Mass of fuel [kg]
Mass fraction fuel and batteries
Gravity [m/sec²]
Air density [kg/m³]
Prop diameter [in]
Prop diameter [m]
Prop efficiency
Motor efficiency
# battery cells
Rated battery capacity [Ah]
Battery voltage [volts]
Battery mass [kg]
# batteries
# motors
Auxiliary current [A]
Total mass [kg]
Power required per prop [W]
Power required system [W]
Fuel burn rate (2.4kW) [L/hr]
Endurance [min]
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6.8
0.30
4.2
13.7
0.76
3
2.3
0.2
9.86
1.2
29
0.74
0.8
0.8
6
5
22.2
0.85
2
6
5
22.8
282.8
2232
2.5
57.6

Fixed-wing Sizing
Fixed-wing sizing was completed for a Group 1 electric vehicle and a Group 2
gasoline-powered vehicle. The maximum takeoff weights (𝑊𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑜𝑓𝑓 ) for the electric and
gasoline UVs are the maximum allowable for Group 1 and Group 2 vehicles, which are 9
kilograms and 25 kilograms respectively. Vehicle airspeeds (𝑣) were varied for both
vehicles so high and low endurance estimates can be compared. The lift-to-drag ratios
(𝐿/𝐷) were also varied in order to provide endurance ranges. The endurance equation is
similar to the multirotor endurance equation, but the battery power equation incorporates
the takeoff weight, the vehicle air speed, the lift-to-drag ratio, and the summated
propulsion efficiencies (𝜂𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 ) from the electronic speed controller, the propeller,
and the motor (Equations 8-9) [45].

𝐸=

𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 ∙𝑉𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦

𝑃𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦 =

𝑃𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦

𝑊𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑜𝑓𝑓 ∙𝑣
𝐿/𝐷∙∏ 𝜂𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛

(8)

(9)

For the fixed-wing vehicles, specific payloads were not chosen for mass. Instead,
a mass fraction of 15% of the takeoff weight was used for the allowable payload mass in
order to estimate the endurance. The endurances for the Group 1 electric vehicle range
from 41 to 69 minutes when flying at a constant angle of attack at the given cruise
airspeeds. A summary of the estimated endurances and ranges can be seen in Table 13.
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Table 13. Group 1 electric fixed-wing endurance estimate
Airspeed [m/s]
L/D
Mass fraction battery
Mass fraction payload
Battery mass allowable [kg]
Payload mass allowable [kg]
Total mass [kg]
Gravity [m/s²]
Prop efficiency
Motor efficiency
# battery cells
Rated battery capacity [Ah]
Battery voltage [volts]
Battery mass [kg]
# batteries
Battery efficiency
Permissible battery discharge
Usable battery capacity [Ah]
Power required thrust [W]
Power required from battery [W]
Endurance [hr]
Endurance [min]

16
6
0.3
0.15
2.73
1.36
9
9.86
0.8
0.8
6
10
22.2
1.32
2
0.9
0.8
14.4
239.0
373.5
0.9
51.4

20
6
0.3
0.15
2.73
1.36
9
9.86
0.8
0.8
6
10
22.2
1.32
2
0.9
0.8
14.4
298.8
466.9
0.7
41.1

16
8
0.3
0.15
2.73
1.36
9
9.86
0.8
0.8
6
10
22.2
1.32
2
0.9
0.8
14.4
179.3
280.1
1.1
68.5

20
8
0.3
0.15
2.73
1.36
9
9.86
0.8
0.8
6
10
22.2
1.32
2
0.9
0.8
14.4
224.1
350.1
0.9
54.8

The endurance estimate for gasoline engine requires the brake specific fuel consumption
(𝐵𝑆𝐹𝐶 ) (Equation 10). A representative vehicle that is under the 25-kilogram Group 2

𝐸=

𝐿/𝐷∙𝜂𝑝
𝑣∙𝐵𝑆𝐹𝐶

∙ 𝑙𝑛 (

1
1−𝑀𝐹𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙

)

(10)

threshold is the Silver Fox, which has a 𝐵𝑆𝐹𝐶 of 395 grams per kilowatt-hour [49]. The
estimated endurances for a gasoline-powered vehicle using this 𝐵𝑆𝐹𝐶 range from 12 to
24 hours with a payload near 2 kilograms (Table 14).
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Table 14. Group 2 gasoline fixed-wing endurance estimate
Airspeed [m/s]
L/D
Mass fraction fuel
Mass fraction payload
Fuel [kg]
Payload [kg]
Total mass [kg]
Prop efficiency
BSFC [g/kW-hr]
Endurance [hr]

20
6
0.25
0.15
3.25
1.95
13.0
0.8
395
17.7

30
6
0.25
0.15
3.25
1.95
13.0
0.8
395
11.8

20
8
0.25
0.15
3.25
1.95
13.0
0.8
395
23.6

30
8
0.25
0.15
3.25
1.95
13.0
0.8
395
15.8

Feasibility for Current Radiological Search Operations
At a minimum, the conceptualized system would serve useful for a portion of
current operations. Executing the entire operation from the initial search through
completing source disposal is unlikely. This is due to the potential unfavorable scenarios
and environmental conditions that could be encountered, especially when weighing the
limited performance of certain vehicles such as the electric multirotor endurance and
payload capacity. Incorporating the system into a portion of operations is very feasible.
For instance, conducting an initial search of a large area would be extremely useful for
responding personnel, especially if the terrain is difficult to navigate by foot or is not
accessible by vehicle. Once the initial search area has been decreased, unmanned
platforms could provide an excellent asset for surveillance by providing immediate
feedback to personnel on the ground. However, confirmation activities using the
unmanned system may have limited applicability. In most permissible scenarios, human
operators are best suited to finish ground operations including spectrum collection and
follow-on activities. Non-permissible environments may warrant the full utilization of
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the radiological search system, especially when strong sources or nefarious activity and
entrapments are involved. Nevertheless, utilizing the system in place of human operators
is dependent on system-mitigated hazards and efficiently accomplishing the tasks
expected of human teams.
When considering the estimated endurances for the vehicle power plant
configurations, there are performance constraints for some vehicles and optionality for
others. The fixed-wing is able to execute the mission using both electric and gasoline
power plants. The endurance and payload capacity are much higher for the gasoline
engine, but the overall size of the vehicle is increased. The larger size could decrease
vehicle maneuverability, forcing the vehicle to fly at a higher and safer operating altitude.
This is not ideal for detecting radiation. Therefore, detector sensitivity, operating
altitude, and airspeed should be assessed when selecting the fixed-wing vehicle and
detector payload. On the other hand, multirotor vehicles are limited to hybrid-electric
setups in order to provide sufficient endurance while carrying a detector payload. This
would supply enough power to ingress, collect a spectrum, and egress from any estimated
source location. Battery-powered multirotors offer limited endurance and are too risky
for incorporating into the radiological search system.
An important aspect of evaluating system feasibility is the cost of the system,
which depends on design decisions and other factors that are not the focus of this
research. Regardless of having a tangible price, the same comparison needs to be made
concerning the cost of the system against the utility it provides the user. The
procurement cost and recurring costs will not be worthwhile for some agencies based
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upon their scope of responsibility and the probability that they will have to respond to a
lost or stolen radiological source. The typical small-town police department would not
benefit from this system as both the probability of response is low and there is most likely
a federal or state asset that is the principal agency for this type of emergency response.
Agencies that would benefit from this system would be those responsible for large
metropolitan areas, have a high-threat environment including radiological material, cover
high-density areas of NRC Category 1 and Category 2 radioactive materials, and those
that are deemed principal responding agencies per governing policy. State and local
agencies that could realistically benefit from an unmanned search system include large
metropolitan area police departments and high-volume ports. Federal applicability ties
directly to existing policy and emergency response plans that define who is responsible
for specific emergency scenarios and jurisdictional areas, such as the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the DOE and national laboratories, the Department of Homeland Security,
and the DoD. For example, the Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) under the DOE
is one of many organizations formed to assist with radiological emergency responses.
The United States is split into nine geographic regions that are covered by separate RAP
teams [50]. These teams could benefit from an unmanned radiological search system as
part of their equipment suite to cover the array of radiological response missions they are
responsible for.
The last issue that this system would introduce is logistical requirements on the
owning organization. Like the initial procurement cost of the system, the cost for
maintenance and replacement parts should be measured against the utility of the system.
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Maintenance issues can be time consuming and costly, which depends on the complexity
of the system and the necessity to procure specialty tools or equipment. If maintenance
is completed by the owning organization, maintenance hours on this system would
decrease hours spent on other serviced equipment and potentially impact other mission
areas. Increased manpower or dedicated maintenance technicians may be necessary,
which also increases the overall cost. If a separate maintenance contract is determined to
be the optimal route, this requires continual funding to ensure the system maintains
operational readiness. The aforementioned costs will help decision-makers determine the
realistic acquisition and implementation of this system.
Utility to Other Missions
It is crucial to look at the applicability and extension of the radiological search
system to other mission areas. Expanding the operational reach of the system to other
mission areas would also increase the overall value for government and private entities.
This increase in the asset’s value could result in more emphasis on mission application,
funding, maintenance, and development of future systems and system payloads.
Providing a niche-solution to the radiological search mission will only attract niche
customers. An infrequently used equipment set makes it challenging for the end user to
reorient on system functionality and could lead to mechanical maintenance issues due to
inactivity. Therefore, expanding the applicability of the system should be beneficial in
terms of utility and cost effectiveness. Some consequences of expanding the mission
coverage could include optional sizing of ground and air vehicles, the inclusion of a
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water-borne platform, and a more flexible vehicle architecture that can interface with
numerous payloads.
In order to promote a flexible system that can apply to other missions, some
modifications will need to be made. The system architecture is currently geared toward a
radiological search mission with three specific vehicle options that all serve a certain
purpose and accomplish certain tasks. There is some flexibility built into the system with
separate modems for autopilot, video, and payloads. However, the promoted sizing for
both the vehicle chassis and the power plant configurations are geared toward lifting a
6.8-kilogram payload for the multirotor and ground UVs as well as providing increased
endurance for the fixed-wing UV by integrating a combustion engine. These narrowed
solutions serve the purpose of meeting the intent established in the CONOPS. In order to
provide a more comprehensive system, a new CONOPS and system architecture should
be developed with a more holistic approach to incorporate current and emerging
missions. As previously discussed, this would necessitate the customization of some
hardware components such as the communication modem and processor suite in addition
to on-board and GCS software. These additions would provide the capability for multiple
vehicles to interchange payloads and the ability to reprogram system software to be
compatible with a variety of components and data types.
Summary
The radiological search system has been characterized starting with the system
CONOPS and resulting in the physical framework to meet the capabilities and
assumptions determined by the CONOPS. Following the characterization of the system,
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a feasibility analysis considered the potential benefits and disadvantages that the system
presents and must be evaluated when determining the overall utility of the system to the
mission area. The analysis determined that the system could apply to current radiological
search operations but may be limited to certain portions of the mission and constrained to
specific organizations. Lastly, it was concluded that the system could be applied to other
missions, but it may need to be modified to provide enhanced flexibility and a more
refined product.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
Overview
Within the counter-WMD mission space, radiological and nuclear terrorism is an
imminent and constant threat to United States national security. Developing and
employing new technologies is crucial for safeguarding this nation, and a radiological
search system is a potential solution to assist and strengthen the radiological search
mission space. It would provide more execution options to responding personnel and the
ability to remove the human element from hazardous situations.
Review of Findings
A CONOPS was developed by incorporating mission needs and constraints for
radiological search operations. Utilizing the radiological search CONOPS, use cases and
a functional decomposition were derived that account for the necessary tasks to complete
radiological search missions. A physical architecture was created in order to allocate
physical components to satisfy task completion. After completing the hierarchical
decomposition, it is evident that the system necessitates a multidimensional construct
with multiple vehicle platforms and distinct detector payloads that are governed by
scenario or mission criteria. Each detector technology can be optimally applied to select
portions of the radiological search mission, such as initial search operations or gamma
spectrum collection. Similarly, certain vehicle platforms are ideal for or are limited to
specific segments of the mission. In order to cover the gamut of radiological search
mission tasks, the system needs multiple vehicle options and interchangeable detector
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payloads with an adaptable system framework. The conceptual system was found to be
feasible in terms of constructability and operability based upon currently available
technologies, but it may have limited application to the mission area. Hybrid-electric
power plants would be a necessity for multirotor endurance and payload capacity,
whereas fixed-wing vehicles could safely operate with battery or gasoline-powered
options. In order to maximize the utility and effectiveness of the system to other DoD
mission areas, the system needs to be expanded to provide more optionality for payload
integration, vehicle selection, and software flexibility. This includes a universal system
architecture and software suite that can adapt to emerging technologies and mission
areas.
Study Limitations
The research was scoped to cover system application to radiological and nuclear
material search and spectroscopy activities in the next two to five years. Assumptions
guided the creation of the CONOPS, as user requirements for the system do not exist.
The research did not incorporate consequence management surveying following
accidents or terrorism activity involving nuclear or radiological materials. Content was
limited to publicly available information and did not dwell at a higher-level of
classification. Tactics, techniques, and procedures for the system were not covered, as
the focus was characterizing the system and its operational feasibility and utility of the
system to the radiological search mission. Lastly, research was limited by funding and
time constraints.
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Future Research
There are multiple avenues for future research involving unmanned systems to
accomplish radiological search missions. Options align with a continuation of the
Systems Engineering “V” concept by conducting a detailed system design, developing
custom hardware or software for the vehicles and GCS, or completing a cost analysis of
system procurement and lifecycle operating costs for the end user. Utilizing a decisionbased engineering design framework will provide rigor to the engineering design process
and ensures that value theory is applied to system development [51]. These additional
areas would provide more tangible findings and insight to the system’s utility when
weighed against acquisition and recurring costs.
Another research opportunity is refining or building a new architecture to expand
the radiological search system to multiple mission areas. The application of the system to
other missions was briefly discussed in Chapter IV. This would include additional
ground and air vehicles, waterborne vehicles for maritime operations, a custom
communication and processing package, and custom system software for both the GCS
and UVs. An extended application to current mission areas with the flexibility to cover
emerging missions would greatly increase the utility and value of the system.
In Chapter IV’s design considerations, employing handheld detectors on system
vehicles was considered for increasing the flexibility of the overall system and avoiding a
mission stoppage if conditions change. It would be beneficial to compare commonly
used handheld detectors to COTS and GOTS detectors designed for vehicle applications.
Detectors can be evaluated on performance in different radiation field configurations,
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vehicle emplacement options and limitations, integration with system hardware and
software, and expected procurement and lifecycle costs.
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Appendix A. Subsystem Physical Allocation Matrices
Table 15. Fixed-wing vehicle physical allocation matrix

Analyze spectrum data

Calculate target coord
Capture video

↗

↗

Collect rad data

↗

↗

↗

↗
↗

↗

Collect rad spectrum
Combine rad data/telemetry
Conduct BIT

↗

↗

Connect to GCS

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗
↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

Connect to vehicle
Construct MP
Create rad map
Display MP status
Display rad data
Display rad map
Display rad spectrum
Display radionuclide
Display target coord
Display telemetry
Display video
Follow search pattern

↗

Initiate search
Load MP

↗

↗
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↗

Servo

Propeller

ESC

Airframe

Module Summary

Self-destruct package

Optical kill switch
Power distribution
board
Wiring

Ignition

Gas generator

Fuel tank

Battery

Video transmitter

Radiation detector

Payload Modem

↗

Gimbal

↗

↗

Camera

↗

↗

Pitot sensor

↗

↗

GPS/ Compass

↗

Auto takeoff

Autopilot Modem

Module Summary

Ignition power switch

Vehicle

Auto land

Autopilot

Module Summary

SelfDestruct

Power Module

System Summary

Payload Module

Module Summary

Navigation Module

Module Summary

Legend
Allocated - ↗

Perform GCS activities
Perform rad measurement

↗

Perform rad search activities

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗
↗

↗

↗

↗
↗

↗

↗
↗

↗

Perform vehicle activities

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

Perform vehicle data comm

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

Process
Provide data comm w/ vehicle
Provide I/O w/ GCS operator
Provide video

↗

Receive cmd

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗
↗

↗
↗

Receive MP status
Receive rad data
Receive spectrum data
Receive telemetry
Receive video
Report MP load status

↗

↗

↗

Send cmd
Send rad data

↗

↗

↗

↗

Send spectrum data
Send telemetry

↗

Send video

↗

↗

↗

↗
↗

↗

↗

Store rad data
Store spectrum data
Store target coord
Store telemetry
Store video
Trigger self-destruct actuator ↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

Write MP
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↗

↗

Servo

Propeller

ESC

Airframe

Module Summary

Self-destruct package

Optical kill switch
Power distribution
board
Wiring

Ignition

Gas generator

↗

Fuel tank

↗

Battery

↗

Video transmitter

↗

Perform controlled movement ↗

Radiation detector

↗

Payload Modem

↗

Gimbal

↗

Camera

↗

Perform autopilot functions

Pitot sensor

↗

↗

GPS/ Compass

↗

↗

Autopilot Modem

↗

↗

Autopilot

↗

Navigate waypoints

↗

Module Summary

Ignition power switch

Vehicle

Loiter

↗

Module Summary

SelfDestruct

Power Module

System Summary

Payload Module

Module Summary

Navigation Module

Module Summary

Legend
Allocated - ↗

Table 16. Ground vehicle physical allocation matrix

Analyze spectrum data
Auto land

↗

↗

↗

↗

Auto takeoff

↗

↗

↗

↗

Calculate target coord
Capture video

↗

↗

Collect rad data

↗

↗

Collect rad spectrum

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

Combine rad data/telemetry
Conduct BIT

↗

↗

Connect to GCS

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗
↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

Connect to vehicle
Construct MP
Create rad map
Display MP status
Display rad data
Display rad map
Display rad spectrum
Display radionuclide
Display target coord
Display telemetry
Display video
Follow search pattern

↗

Initiate search
Load MP

↗

↗
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↗

Servo

Motor

Ground vehicle chassis

ESC

Articulator arm

Vehicle

Module Summary

Self-destruct package

SelfDestruct

Module Summary

Wiring

Battery
Power distribution
board

Module Summary

Video transmitter

Spectrum collector

Radiation detector

Payload Modem

Camera

Module Summary

GPS/Compass

Autopilot Modem

Autopilot

Module Summary

System Summary

Power Module

Payload Module

Navigation Module

Gimbal

Legend
Allocated - ↗

Loiter

↗

↗

↗

↗

Navigate waypoints

↗

↗

↗

↗

Perform autopilot functions

↗

↗

↗

↗

Perform controlled movement ↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

Perform GCS activities
Perform rad measurement

↗

↗

↗

Perform rad search activities

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗
↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗
↗

↗

Perform vehicle activities

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

Perform vehicle data comm

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

Process
Provide data comm w/ vehicle
Provide I/O w/ GCS operator
Provide video

↗

Receive cmd

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗
↗

↗
↗

Receive MP status
Receive rad data
Receive spectrum data
Receive telemetry
Receive video
Report MP load status

↗

↗

↗

Send cmd
Send rad data

↗

↗

↗

↗

Send spectrum data

↗

↗

↗

↗

Send telemetry

↗

Send video

↗

↗

↗

↗
↗

↗

↗

Store rad data
Store spectrum data
Store target coord
Store telemetry
Store video
Trigger self-destruct actuator ↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

Write MP
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↗

↗

Servo

Motor

Ground vehicle chassis

ESC

Articulator arm

Vehicle

Module Summary

Self-destruct package

SelfDestruct

Module Summary

Wiring

Battery
Power distribution
board

Module Summary

Video transmitter

Power Module

Spectrum collector

Radiation detector

Payload Modem

Camera

Payload Module

Module Summary

GPS/Compass

Autopilot Modem

Autopilot

Module Summary

System Summary

Navigation Module

Gimbal

Legend
Allocated - ↗

Table 17. Multirotor vehicle physical allocation matrix

Analyze spectrum data
Auto land

↗

↗

↗

↗

Auto takeoff

↗

↗

↗

↗

Calculate target coord
Capture video

↗

↗

Collect rad data

↗

↗

Collect rad spectrum

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗
↗

↗

Combine rad data/telemetry
Conduct BIT

↗

↗

Connect to GCS

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗
↗

↗

↗

↗

Connect to vehicle
Construct MP
Create rad map
Display MP status
Display rad data
Display rad map
Display rad spectrum
Display radionuclide
Display target coord
Display telemetry
Display video
Follow search pattern

↗

Initiate search
Load MP

↗

↗
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↗

Propeller

Multirotor frame

ESC

Vehicle

Module Summary

Self-destruct package

Module Summary

Wiring

Optical kill switch
Power distribution
board

Ignition power switch

Ignition

Gas generator

Fuel tank

Battery

Module Summary

Video transmitter

Spectrum collector

Radiation detector

Payload Modem

Camera

Module Summary

GPS/Compass

Distance Sensor

Autopilot Modem

Autopilot

Module Summary

System Summary

SelfDestruct

Power Module

Payload Module

Navigation Module

Gimbal

Legend
Allocated - ↗

Loiter

↗

↗

↗

↗

Navigate waypoints

↗

↗

↗

↗

Perform autopilot functions

↗

↗

↗

↗

Perform controlled movement ↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

Perform GCS activities
Perform rad measurement

↗

↗

↗

Perform rad search activities

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗
↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗
↗

↗

Perform vehicle activities

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

Perform vehicle data comm

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

Process
Provide data comm w/ vehicle
Provide I/O w/ GCS operator
Provide video

↗

Receive cmd

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗
↗

↗
↗

Receive MP status
Receive rad data
Receive spectrum data
Receive telemetry
Receive video
Report MP load status

↗

↗

↗

Send cmd
Send rad data

↗

↗

↗

↗

Send spectrum data

↗

↗

↗

↗

Send telemetry

↗

Send video

↗

↗

↗

↗
↗

↗

↗

Store rad data
Store spectrum data
Store target coord
Store telemetry
Store video
Trigger self-destruct actuator ↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

Write MP
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↗

↗

Propeller

Multirotor frame

ESC

Vehicle

Module Summary

Self-destruct package

Wiring

Optical kill switch
Power distribution
board

Ignition power switch

Ignition

Gas generator

Fuel tank

Battery

Module Summary

Video transmitter

Module Summary

SelfDestruct

Power Module

Spectrum collector

Radiation detector

Payload Modem

Camera

Payload Module

Module Summary

GPS/Compass

Distance Sensor

Autopilot Modem

Autopilot

System Summary

Module Summary

Navigation Module

Gimbal

Legend
Allocated - ↗

Analyze spectrum data

↗

↗

↗

↗

Video receiver

Payload Modem

GPS base station

GCS software

GCS computer

Autopilot Modem

Antenna tracker

System Summary

Legend
Allocated - ↗

Radiation processing &
mapping software

Table 18. Ground control station physical allocation matrix

Auto land
Auto takeoff
Calculate target coord
Capture video
Collect rad data
Collect rad spectrum
Combine rad data/telemetry

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

Conduct BIT
Connect to GCS
Connect to vehicle

↗

Construct MP

↗

↗
↗

↗

Create rad map

↗

↗

Display MP status

↗

↗

Display rad data

↗

↗

↗

Display rad map

↗

↗

↗

Display rad spectrum

↗

↗

↗

Display radionuclide

↗

↗

↗

Display target coord

↗

↗

Display telemetry

↗

↗

Display video

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗
↗

↗
↗
↗

Follow search pattern
Initiate search
Load MP
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↗

Video receiver

Radiation processing &
mapping software

Payload Modem

GPS base station

GCS software

GCS computer

Autopilot Modem

Antenna tracker

System Summary

Legend
Allocated - ↗

Loiter
Navigate waypoints
Perform autopilot functions
Perform controlled movement
Perform GCS activities

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗

Perform rad measurement
Perform rad search activities
Perform vehicle activities
Perform vehicle data comm
Process

↗

Provide data comm w/ vehicle ↗
Provide I/O w/ GCS operator ↗

↗
↗

↗
↗

↗

Provide video
Receive cmd
Receive MP status

↗

↗

Receive rad data

↗

↗

Receive spectrum data

↗

↗

Receive telemetry

↗

↗

Receive video

↗

↗

↗

↗

↗
↗
↗
↗
↗

Report MP load status
Send cmd

↗

↗

↗

Send rad data
Send spectrum data
Send telemetry
Send video
Store rad data

↗

↗

Store spectrum data

↗

↗

Store target coord

↗

↗

Store telemetry

↗

↗

Store video

↗

↗

Trigger self-destruct actuator
Write MP

↗

↗
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↗

↗

↗

↗

Appendix B. System Use Cases

Description:
This Use Case encompasses deployment of the Rad Search System vehicle(s) and ingress to the search
area.
Preconditions:
Successful completion of Perform Setup Use Case
GPS Lock
Primary Flow:
1. Ground Control Station Operator initiates Launch mode through Ground Control Station
2. Ground Control Station changes Vehicle mode to Launch
3. Vehicle enters Launch mode
4. Vehicle transmits telemetry to Ground Control Station(s)
5. Ground Control Station(s) receives and displays telemetry data
6. Ground Control Station(s) stores telemetry data
7. Ground Crew launches Vehicle
8. Vehicle establishes controlled movement or stable flight
9. Vehicle maneuvers toward search area
10. Ground Control Station Operator observes received data on Ground Control Station
11. Once Vehicle arrives at Search Insertion point, it enters Search mode
12. End Use Case
Alternate Flow:
At any time:
a. If bad Vehicle health, Ground Control Station Operator enters RTL command on Ground Control
Station
b. Ground Control Station sends RTL command to Vehicle
c. Vehicle enters RTL mode
At any time:
a. Operator initiates <<include>> Plan Mission Use Case
b. Vehicle ingresses to new Search Insertion point
At any time:
a. If vehicle compromise is evident, execute <<extend>> Perform Self-Destruct Use Case
Postconditions: Vehicle arrives at Search Insertion point and enters Search mode
Involves:
GNSS
Ground Control Station Operator
Ground Crew

Figure 16. Deploy and ingress use case
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Description:
This Use Case covers the RTL actions required to return the vehicle to home location or specified
location with recovery.
Preconditions: Vehicle has entered RTL mode
Primary Flow:
1. Vehicle maneuvers toward home/recovery point
2. Vehicle arrives at home/recovery point
3. Vehicle executes auto-land maneuver
4. Ground Control Station Operator and Ground Crew recovers Vehicle
5. End Use Case
Alternate Flow: At any time:
a. If bad vehicle health, Ground Control Station Operator enters RTL command on Ground Control
Station
b. Ground Control Station sends RTL command to Vehicle
c. Vehicle enters RTL mode
At any time:
a. Ground Control Station Operator initiates Plan Mission Use Case
b. Vehicle ingresses to new Search Insertion point
At any time:
a. If vehicle compromise is evident, execute <<extend>> Perform Self-Destruct Use Case
Postconditions: Vehicle is safely recovered by Ground Crew
Involves:
GNSS
Ground Control System Operator
Ground Crew

Figure 17. Egress and recover use case
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Description:
This Use Case covers confirmation activities
Preconditions: Target has been located and a Vehicle has entered Confirmation mode
Primary Flow:
1. Vehicle transmits telemetry data, rad data, and video to Ground Control Station(s) and Off-Board C2
2. Ground Control Station(s) receives and displays telemetry data, rad data, and video
3. Ground Control Station(s) stores telemetry data, rad data, and video
4. Vehicle navigates to and hovers or remains near target
5. Ground Control Station sends collect rad spectrum data command
6. Vehicle receives and initiates rad spectrum collection
7. Vehicle transmits rad spectrum data
8. Ground Control Station(s) receives, stores, and displays rad spectrum data
9. Ground Control Station Operator terminates rad spectrum collection
10. Ground Control Station processes rad spectrum data and displays radionuclide identification
11. Ground Control Station Operator initiates RTL
12. Ground Control Station sends RTL command to Vehicle
13. Vehicle enters RTL mode
14. End Use Case
Alternate Flow:
At any time:
a. If bad vehicle health, Ground Control Station Operator enters RTL command on Ground Control
Station
b. Ground Control Station sends RTL command to Vehicle
c. Vehicle enters RTL mode
At any time:
a. If vehicle no longer required due to deployed sensor package, Ground Control Station Operator enters
RTL command
b. Ground Control Station sends RTL command to Vehicle
c. Vehicle enters RTL mode
At any time:
a. Ground Control Station Operator initiates <<include>> Plan Mission Use Case
b. Vehicle ingresses to new Search Insertion point or Confirmation coordinates
At any time:
a. If vehicle compromise is evident, execute <<extend>> Perform Self-Destruct Use Case
b. Vehicle self-destructs
Postconditions: Vehicle hovers or remains near target for > 5 minutes and rad spectrum is stored and
displayed on Ground Control Station(s) with suspected radionuclide identification; Vehicle enters RTL
mode
Involves:
GNSS
Off-Board C2 Operator
Target

Figure 18. Perform confirmation use case
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Description:
This Use Case covers execution of search patterns
Preconditions: Vehicle arrives at insertion point and has transitioned to Search mode; Mission Plan is
loaded by GCS
Primary Flow:
1. Vehicle transmits telemetry data, rad data, and video to Ground Control Station(s) and Off-Board C2
2. Ground Control Station(s) receives and displays telemetry data, rad data, and video
3. Ground Control Station(s) continuously combines telemetry and rad data and displays as a radiation
strength map
3. Ground Control Station(s) stores telemetry data, rad data, and video
4. Vehicle follows search pattern according to Mission Plan
5. Ground Control Station Operator and Off-Board C2 monitor rad data, navigation data, and video
6. Vehicle completes search pattern according to Mission Plan
7. Ground Control Station determines target(s) coordinates from received rad data and telemetry data
8. Ground Control Station Operator commands change to Confirmation mode
9. Ground Control Station sends Confirmation mode change
10. Vehicle enters Confirmation mode
11. End Use Case
Alternate Flow:
At any time:
a. If bad vehicle health, Ground Control Station Operator enters RTL command
b. Ground Control Station sends RTL command to Vehicle
c. Vehicle enters RTL mode
At any time:
a. If vehicle no longer required due to deployed sensor package, Ground Control Station Operator enters
RTL command
b. Ground Control Station sends RTL command to Vehicle
c. Vehicle enters RTL mode
At any time:
a. Ground Control Station Operator initiates <<include>> Plan Mission Use Case
b. Vehicle ingresses to new Search Insertion point (may be used to further loiter or investigate target
location)
At any time:
a. If vehicle compromise is evident, execute <<extend>> Perform Self-Destruct Use Case
b. Vehicle self-destructs
Postconditions: Target is identified through radiation sensor data and telemetry data and target
coordinates are calculated and displayed on Ground Control Station(s); Vehicle transitions to
Confirmation mode
Involves:
GNSS
Off-Board C2 Operator
Target

Figure 19. Perform search use case
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Description:
This Use Case covers the activities required to perform commanded self-destruct.
Preconditions: Vehicle is navigating in a location away from the Ground Control Station Operator
Primary Flow:
1. Operator initiates Ditch mode on Ground Control Station
2. Ground Control Station sends Self-Destruct mode change to Vehicle
3. Vehicle initiates Self-Destruct mode
4. Vehicle processor sends command to A/P to crash
5. Vehicle processor sends command to embedded self-destruct actuator
6. Embedded self-destruct actuator initiates and destroys processor
7. Vehicle crashes
8. End Use Case
Postconditions: Vehicle is successfully crashed and system is inoperable by other personnel

Figure 20. Perform self-destruct use case
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Description:
This Use Case covers the setup and mission planning for use of the Rad Search System
Preconditions:
Tasking received
Search area defined
Desired radionuclide(s) specified
Primary Flow:
1. Ground Crew and Ground Control Station Operator unpacks equipment
2. Ground Crew and Ground Control Station Operator inventories equipment
2a. If necessary equipment missing - end Use Case
3. Ground Crew and Ground Control Station Operator assembles equipment
4. Ground Crew and Ground Control Station Operator initiate connection between Ground Control
Station and Vehicle(s)
5. Ground Control Station sends connect signal to Vehicle(s)
6. Vehicle(s) makes connection to Ground Control Station
6a. If connection fails, go to step 4. If fail 3x, end Use Case
7. Vehicle(s) begins transmission of rad data, rad spectrum data, telemetry data, and video
8. Ground Control Station displays rad data, rad spectrum data, telemetry data, and video
9. Ground Control Station stores rad data, rad spectrum data, telemetry data, and video
10. Ground Control Station Operator initiates function checks through Ground Control Station
11. Ground Control Station initiates function checks on Vehicle(s)
12. Vehicle(s) performs function checks and sends results to Ground Control Station
13. Ground Control Station displays results of function checks
14. Ground Control Station Operator confirms successful function checks.
14a. If function check unsuccessful, go to step 10. If fail 3x, end Use Case.
15. <<Include>> Perform Mission Plan
15a. If Mission Plan unsuccessful, repeat step 15. If fail 3x, end Use Case
16. End Use Case
Postconditions: System properly configured; mission planning complete; system ready for deployment
Involves:
Ground Control Station Operator
Ground Crew
GNSS

Figure 21. Perform setup use case
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Description:
This Use Case covers actions associated with planning or re-planning a mission. It can be completed
either pre-, or post-launch.
Preconditions: Vehicle has passed function checks and has established comm with Ground Control
Station(s)
Primary Flow:
1. Ground Control Station Operator enters Mission Plan information into Ground Control Station
2. Ground Control Station converts Mission Plan to machine language form
3. Ground Control Station Operator initiates Write Mission Plan function on Ground Control Station
3. Ground Control Station sends machine language Mission Plan to Vehicle(s)
4. Vehicle(s) puts Mission Plan into active memory
5. Vehicle(s) sends indication of successful Mission Plan
6. Ground Station displays indication of successful Mission Plan load
7. End Use Case
Postconditions: Successful receipt of Mission Plan by Vehicle(s)

Figure 22. Plan mission use case
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